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PRIORITIZING PRIVACY IN THE COURTS
AND BEYOND
Babette Boliek†
Big data has affected American life and business in a
variety of ways—inspiring both technological development
and industrial change.  The legal protections for a person’s
right to his or her own personal information, however, have
not matched the growth in the collection and aggregation of
data.  These legal shortcomings are exacerbated when third
party privacy interests are at stake in litigation.  Judicial or-
ders to compel sensitive data are expressly permitted even
under the few privacy statutes that may limit data transfers.
Historically, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favor gener-
ous disclosure of information.  But as litigation becomes more
technical and data collection and transfer costs are decreas-
ing, this Article argues that the judiciary must take an invigo-
rated role in discovery—in particular when third-party privacy
interests are at stake.
First, this Article explores the existing legal support for
informational privacy rights in constitutions, statutes, and
tort.  As explained, the legal protections that exist are slim.
This Article employs a novel theoretical model to illustrate that
the current law is particularly ill-suited to protect third-party
privacy rights in discovery because the law does not penalize
parties for acquiescence to overreaching discovery requests.
Therefore, with the current legal backdrop, to protect informa-
tional privacy rights, the judge’s role as the discovery gate-
keeper is imperative.  To emphasize the need for a privacy-
sensitive judiciary, the Article examines an ongoing litigation,
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Education, where the otherwise FERPA-protected school
records of an estimated ten million students were ordered to
be disclosed—including addresses, social security numbers,
birthdates, disciplinary records, and test scores.
This Article proposes a three-step framework to protect the
privacy interest of litigants and affected third parties.  The
time is ripe for renewed judicial focus on privacy interests in
the courts, and a recent amendment to the Federal Rules was
made precisely to encourage litigants and the courts to limit
the size and scope of civil discovery.  In addition to discovery
reforms, this Article proposes changes to the law to incentivize
collectors of data to either decrease collection of sensitive data
or increase investment in privacy protections.
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INTRODUCTION
In this era of big data, how should a judge prudently mea-
sure the burdens of the parties—including privacy and cyber-
security concerns—yet permit discovery as a legitimate case
may demand?  It is a simple question of remarkable import.  In
the process of civil discovery, litigants request the release of
incredibly sensitive, protected information possessed by
others.  The judiciary is given the unique authority to either
grant or deny these requests using a recently enacted statutory
test: is the request “proportional to the needs of the case”?1
That procedural declaration demands a balancing of competing
needs including a person’s need to protect private information
(the privacy interest)2 against the plaintiff’s need for disclosure
of that information.
To protect a person’s privacy interest, a balance is exactly
what is needed.  On the one extreme is complete exposure, with
no privacy interest protection, and on the other extreme is zero
exposure and complete privacy.  The tension between these two
absolutes is explained well by Justice Brandeis, an influential
leader in the United States’ privacy right discussions.  Brandeis
noted the need for personal privacy as follows:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advanc-
ing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from
the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture,
has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
2 For ease of discussion, this Article refers to the “informational privacy
interest” as the “privacy interest” or “privacy.”  Although technically the term
“informational privacy interest” has been invoked in relation to government col-
lected data, this Article assumes that an informational privacy interest may arise
when sensitive, personal data is in the hands of another—whether that “other” is
a private (non–governmental) or public entity.  The distinction between private
and public collection of personal data is reflected in the discussion where
appropriate.
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privacy have become more essential to the individual; but
modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions
upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress,
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.3
On the other hand, Brandeis also praised the beneficial
impact of information disclosure on the democratic process:
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light
the most efficient policeman.”4  Both protecting privacy and
disclosing certain information are clearly opposite but valuable
actions—the socially ideal mix involves a balance of the two.
Like any balancing test, the legal and social emphasis can
swing from one extreme to the other.  This Article squarely sets
forth that the current legal framework—constitutional, statu-
tory, and tort protections for privacy—overly favors disclosure.
Further, this Article argues that the undervaluation of the pri-
vacy interest (unnecessarily) increases cybersecurity risks.  Fi-
nally, this Article shows that even if the undergirding legal
framework for privacy protection is strengthened, judges will
still be granted the special right to override constitutional, stat-
utory, and tort law privacy protections when they order disclo-
sure of information by judicial order.  Because of this unique
gatekeeper role, this Article specifically addresses the privacy
and cybersecurity issues that judges should consider when
they compel discovery.
Part of why the privacy interest is legally undervalued is
that modern technological realities have outstripped the pri-
vacy protections that were largely drafted to protect paper
records held in file cabinets.  Information is quantitatively dif-
ferent in today’s age.  Little traces of information in the wrong
hands can aggregate to unravel and destroy trade secrets, pri-
vate reputations, and more.  That said, the United States’ legal
framework for protecting the privacy interest has yet to fully
recognize the challenges that advancing technologies bring.
Unlike other countries that not only recognize but actively pro-
tect the privacy interest of their citizens,5 the United States has
3 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 196 (1890).
4 Louis D. Brandeis, Louis D. Brandeis Quotes, BRANDEIS U., http://www.
brandeis.edu/legacyfund/bio.html [https://perma.cc/AA6T-LP3V] (last visited
Mar. 2, 2017) (originally stated in Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do,
HARPER’S WKLY. Dec. 20, 1913, at 10).
5 See, e.g., Factsheet on the “Right to be Forgotten” Ruling (C-131/12), EUR.
COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/fact-
sheet_data_protection_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/K63T-K86N] (last visited Aug. 7,
2016) (explaining the Court of Justice for the European Union’s recognition of the
right to be forgotten in certain circumstances); see also Alex Hern, Google Takes
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been content to take a rather laissez-faire approach to the pri-
vacy interest.6   There is evidence, however, that American citi-
zens have a growing concern about who has access to their
data and for what purpose.7  In a related but distinct concern,
the American public’s desire for increased cybersecurity of pri-
vate data has risen as reports of hacking and data breaches
surge.8
As this Article sets forth, legal privacy protections in the
United States are few.9  There are no constitutional privacy
rights to one’s own data, for example.  Nor are there currently
many statutory protections for information providers whose
personal data may become caught up in a litigation to which
they are not a direct party.  Even tort law, which can incentivize
protecting private data of third parties by imposing data disclo-
sure liability, currently delivers very limited satisfaction to in-
formation providers.  But even if all these constitutional,
statutory, and tort law regimes were strengthened to protect
third party privacy interests, the judiciary would still stand
alone as an essential, irreplaceable protector of the privacy
interest.  Only the judiciary plays the solemn role of gatekeeper
to discovery requests and is therefore the ultimate guardian of
this country’s corporate, governmental, and individual private
information.10
Right to Be Forgotten Battle to France’s Highest Court, GUARDIAN (May 19, 2016,
8:20 PM) https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/19/google-
right-to-be-forgotten-fight-france-highest-court [https://perma.cc/Z778-7MR9]
(describing Google’s appeal of France’s recognition of the right to be forgotten).
6 See Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US
Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 166–67 n.20 (2012).
7 See Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Secur-
ity, and Surveillance, PEW RES. CTR.: INTERNET & TECH., (May 20, 2015), http://
www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-
and-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/8SHY-643Y] (describing surveys indicating
that 93% of adults state that being in control of who can get information about
them is either “very important” or “somewhat important”).
8 See Ellen Nakashima, Hacks of OPM Databases Compromised 22.1 Million
People, Federal Authorities Say, WASH. POST (Jul. 9, 2015), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-of-security-clearance-
system-affected-21-5-million-people-federal-authorities-say/
?utm_term=.cc75c149c6bf [http://perma.cc/G8V4-X7XA] (describing alarm fol-
lowing security breaches of U.S. government databases holding personnel records
and security-clearance files of over 22 million people).
9 See discussion infra Part I.
10 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(B) (2018) (permitting release of otherwise pro-
tected education records pursuant to a judicial order); 26 U.S.C. § 6103(e)(5)(C),
(2018) (allowing disclosure of otherwise protected tax records by judicial order);
45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(A) (2016) (permitting release of otherwise protected
health records pursuant to a judicial order); Graham H. Todd, Protecting Privi-
leged Communications in the Age of the New DOD Notice and Consent Banner, 36
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There are few government institutions that can match the
judiciary for comprehensive power over personal data held by
both private and public entities.  As a starting point, an individ-
ual’s constitutional right to his or her own information is dubi-
ous at best.  Without such a right, in the absence of statutory
or common law rights to privacy, it is difficult to argue for the
legal protection of privacy once private information is given to
any entity.11  The lack of protection might even include infor-
mation taken by coercion—for example, information a public
school district requires for admission.  While limited, certain
statutory privacy protections do exist, such as the Federal Ed-
ucational Rights and Privacy Act12 (FERPA), the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act13 (HIPAA), and sections
of the Internal Revenue Code,14 which protect federal tax
records from disclosure.  Common to all these statutes, how-
ever, is an exception for the release of information by judicial
order.15
The judicial exemption is necessary to permit evidence of
legal wrongdoing to come to light.  Perhaps the public assumes
that the judiciary will limit the scope of discovery to protect
privacy and will not permit disclosure of data that is unneces-
sary to the case.  But in making decisions on the scope of
discovery, the judiciary may rely heavily on the discovery
agreements reached among private litigants, perhaps merely
rubber stamping the agreed-upon data and procedures to be
turned over.16  This means, for example, if a public school is
REPORTER 18, 21 n.9 (2009) (suggesting a change to Department of Defense inves-
tigations of employee computers to allow for investigation but to prevent disclo-
sure of information except by judicial order); Steven C. Henricks, A Fourth
Amendment Privacy Analysis of the Department of Defense’s DNA Repository for
the Identification of Human Remains: The Law of Fingerprints Can Show Us the
Way, 181 MIL. L. REV. 69, 69 (2004) (describing how the Department of Defense
releases DNA information collected from service members by judicial order).
11 For example, with respect to the Fourth Amendment, an individual does
not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in certain information that is vol-
untarily disclosed to a third party.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44
(1979).
12 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2018).
13 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162 (2016).
14 See 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2016) (keeping tax return records confidential un-
less an exception applies).
15 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(B) (2018) (withholding funds from a public
school that discloses student records without written consent from the parent or a
judicial order or lawfully issued subpoena); 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(A) (2016)
(allowing the disclosure of medical records for law enforcement purposes if a
judicial order so requires); see also supra note 9. R
16 See Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 2015 Year-End Report on the Fed-
eral Judiciary, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/2015year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5ZB-A7TZ] (last visited July 17,
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sued, and the school agrees to give the plaintiff private informa-
tion about a child (e.g. social security number, date of birth,
disciplinary actions, test scores, etc.) it is possible that a judge
will agree and compel the discovery.17  There are certainly
times when sensitive information is not essential to a case, and
a defendant (like the school in this example) may simply agree
to release information because it is easier or cheaper to hand
over the data than to litigate the issue or redact the data.  This
is particularly true when the information at issue is about a
third party, not about the information recipient (holder) itself.
In economic terms, this is an example of misaligned interests.
In other words, the defendant (the recipient of the information)
may bear little cost by disclosing information to the plaintiff—
costs of disclosure will be largely borne by the third party (the
information provider).  But, in contrast, the defendant may
bear high costs if he or she fights against such disclosure.
Unless the defendant internalizes the consequences the disclo-
sure has on the information provider (e.g. public embarrass-
ment, identity theft, loss of employment due to the exposure of
the personal information, etc.) a private discovery agreement
between the plaintiff and that defendant will never protect the
third-party privacy interests.18
Add to this scenario the risk of cybersecurity breaches in
the transfer, storage, and disposal of sensitive data, and the
risks associated with an ill-conceived judicial order explode.19
2016) (encouraging the judiciary to take a more active role in managing the scope
of discovery rather than letting the litigants dictate the scope of discovery and
pace of the litigation). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to
2015 amendment (justifying the amendment by recycling reasoning for the 1985
and 1995 amendments: courts are not involved enough in managing the scope of
discovery).
17 It should be noted that the judge ordering disclosure may be the district
judge or a magistrate judge with delegated authority from the district judge to
handle pre-trial discovery matters. FED. R. CRIM. P. 59 (providing that district
judges have broad authority to delegate duties to magistrate judges).  A district
judge may review—on motion or sua sponte—a magistrate judge’s order and must
set aside an order that is “contrary to law or clearly erroneous.” Id.  Accordingly,
the framework proposed in this Article applies to magistrate judges and district
judges alike.
18 Arguably a third party could intervene to protect their privacy interests.
However, the legal cost to such individuals is high, the ability to join in a class
action with others to intervene is limited, and notice that personal information is
even vulnerable is often scant or after-the-fact.
19 The Department of Justice reported that 17.6 million Americans were vic-
tims of identity theft in 2014, with losses totaling approximately $15.4 billion.
See Erika Harrell, Victims of Identity Theft, 2014, NCJ 248991, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
(Sept. 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit14.pdf [https://perma
.cc/TTU9-UUA4].  However, identity theft can have a persistent effect that is espe-
cially difficult to quantify.  It can take months or years to fix the damage an
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In particular, private litigants may have little incentive to incur
security costs to protect third-party information.  Indeed, the
only immediate liability litigating parties may face related to a
data breach covered by judicial order is the cost associated
with notifying affected individuals and entities that the breach
occurred.20
Many people, including judges, may be unconcerned at
first with the potential of privacy loss by judicial order.  This
may be in large part because privacy awareness and concern
varies among ordinary citizens,21 perhaps because individuals
discount the likelihood, or the consequences, of their own pri-
vacy being put in jeopardy.  But what if the threat of a massive
privacy invasion of millions was not in some hypothetical fu-
ture?  What if the disclosure of incredibly sensitive data such
as names, social security numbers, birthdates, addresses,
mental health records, medication lists, disciplinary records
and more was not a threat, but the very real result of a judicial
order?22  And what if the data to be released were the data of
children?23
The scenario is almost too surreal to comprehend but is
exactly the reality faced by parents and guardians of children
who attended any California public school at any time since
January 1, 2008.24  A federal judge issued a judicial order for
identity thief may cause to one’s credit score, which can significantly impair one’s
ability to get a credit card, buy a car or house, or get approved for student loans.
See Rod J. Rosenstein & Tamera Fine, Identity Theft: Coordination Can Defeat the
Modern–Day “King” and “Duke”, OFFS. OF THE U.S. ATT’YS  https://web.archive
.org/web/20150619222016/https://www.justice.gov/usao/priority-areas/fi
nancial-fraud/identity-theft [https://perma.cc/68V2-T2CM] (last updated Dec.
8, 2014); see also Kimberly Rotter, The Staggering Costs of Identity Theft in the
U.S., CREDIT SESAME  https://www.creditsesame.com/blog/credit/staggering-
costs-of-identity-theft-2/ [https://perma.cc/ZE9H-L9R8] (last updated Jan. 3,
2018).  Finally, that damage may go undetected for years, especially when the
identity stolen is that of a juvenile who will not apply for a credit card or loan until
the child reaches majority.
20 See, e.g., Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Ass’n v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., No.
2:11–CV–03471–KJM–AC, 2016 WL 304564, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016) (or-
dering the defendant to be responsible for all costs associated with posting the
Notice and Objection Form pursuant to FERPA).
21 See Tim Cook, A Message To Our Customers, APPLE INC. (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ [https://perma.cc/SA7Z-TTXX]. See
also, Victoria Schwartz, Corporate Privacy Failures Start at the Top, 58 B.C. L.
REV. 1693, 1697 (2016) (discussing why executives of companies who are not
themselves privacy-aware jeopardize the information of others).
22 See discussion infra Part V.
23 See id.
24 See Notice of Disclosure of Student Records, Morgan Hill Concerned Par-
ents Ass’n v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., No. 2:11–CV–03471 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 29, 2013),
2013 WL 1326301.
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the California Department of Education to gather, consolidate,
and disclose to plaintiffs the complete student records of all
California public school children25—an estimated ten million
student records between 2008 and 2015 alone.26  The records
are to be disclosed in connection with the legal action Morgan
Hill Concerned Parents Ass’n v. California Dep’t of Educ.27  The
case is sympathetic to be sure—a parent organization in the
southern tip of Silicon Valley is concerned that some special-
needs children are not being appropriately accommodated by
the school district.28  The plaintiffs hope that student data col-
lected throughout the state will prove their case.29  But the
case, described at greater length in Part V, is an example of a
failure to protect the privacy and cybersecurity interests of
third parties—school-aged children and their parents and
guardians.
Consider the following two questions set in the Morgan Hill
example.  First, why should private plaintiffs (parents in a local
school district) have access to highly private identifying infor-
mation of any other students, let alone access to the informa-
tion of all the public school children across the state of
California?30  Second, after private plaintiffs run their analyses
(whatever those searches may be) how are the results to be
stored and transferred?
The first question is a privacy concern, and the second is
primarily a cybersecurity concern.  As argued here, a judge
25 Id.
26 See Enrollment by Grade for 2014–15: Statewide Enrollment by Ethnicity
and Grade, CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC.: EDUC.DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, http://dq.cde.ca.gov/
dataquest/Enrollment/GradeEnr.aspx?cChoice=StEnrGrd&cYear=2014-15&c
Level=State&cTopic=Enrollment&myTimeFrame=S&cTypeALL&cGender=B
[https://perma.cc/6D59-NKY9] (last visited Mar. 23, 2016). See also Enrollment,
Graduates and Dropouts in California Public Schools, 1974–75 Through 2013–14,
CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC.: EDUC. DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, http://dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/
EnrGradDrop.asp [https://perma.cc/QU8Q-WF8K] (last visited March. 23,
2016). Looking at the data, approximately 6,235,000 students in grades K–12
were enrolled in California public schools in the 2014–15 academic year.  Then,
approximately 2,837,000 students graduated from California public schools be-
tween 2008 and 2014.  That results in nearly 9.1 million students but does not
account for dropouts and students that transfer out of the California public
school system.
27 Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Ass’n v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., No.
2:11–CV–03471–KJM–AC, 2013 WL 1326301 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2013).
28 Id. at *1.
29 Id. at *2.
30 See e.g., Letter from Patrick A. Chabot, Superintendent, Sonora Union
High School District, to Kimberly J. Mueller, Morgan Hill, No.
2:11–CV–03471–KJM–AC (E.D. Cal. Apr. 11. 2016), ECF No. 173-1 (criticizing the
disclosure of student records).
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must be concerned with both.  In Morgan Hill, for example, a
Special Master was appointed to facilitate the technical discov-
ery requests that this case requires.31  This common practice is
helpful, but understandably the special master is primarily
focused on the cybersecurity concern.  However, that judicially
delegated authority does nothing to limit data exposure in the
first instance.  Indeed, the court may be the only actor that can
protect the privacy interests of third parties by weighing the
privacy burden, limiting discovery, and ordering redactions.
This Article presents a set of common sense principles for
judges and practitioners to properly frame the privacy and
cybersecurity issues that judges should consider when issuing
a discovery order.  Part I of this Article sets forth the current
legal framework for a legal person’s informational privacy
rights: individuals have no clear constitutional right to infor-
mational privacy, statutes provide a few protections for private
information (with many exceptions), and the tort regime se-
verely limits an individual’s ability to sue and recover for the
wrongful disclosure of his or her private information.
Part II of this Article sets forth the historical judicial treat-
ment of the privacy interest.  This Part also discusses the re-
cent changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
unmistakably envision greater judicial involvement in limiting
the scope of discovery orders—a rule change that can be em-
braced by practitioners and judges alike to consider and pro-
tect the privacy interests of the parties and third parties.  Part
III sets out how judicial discovery orders may also include a
cybersecurity calculation.
Part IV sets forth a simple three-part framework to help the
judiciary balance affected parties’ privacy interests and cyber-
security concerns against the need for trial discovery.  As de-
scribed fully in Part IV, this Article recommends that the court
should protect privacy and determine how much weight to
place on the privacy interest at risk by evaluating a proposed
set of factors.  If the privacy concerns are demonstrably high,
as established by the privacy screen suggested in this Article,
the judge may wish to consider appointing a special “privacy
master” to monitor the privacy issues during discovery.  Sec-
ond, the court must limit the data exposed in light of that
weighted privacy interest and protect the disclosed data by
ordering redactions and data aggregation.  Third, the court
must promote cybersecurity to keep the data from being dis-
31 See Order, Morgan Hill, No. 2:11–CV–03471–KJM–AC (Jul. 2, 2015), ECF
No. 116 (appointing a special master to the case).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-5\CRN501.txt unknown Seq: 11 27-AUG-18 15:34
2018] PRIORITIZING PRIVACY IN THE COURTS 1111
seminated further.  Part V describes in-depth the ongoing cau-
tionary tale that catalyzed this discussion: Morgan Hill
Concerned Parents Ass’n v. California Dep’t of Educ.
Finally, Part VI suggests additional contexts in which the
recommendations for judicial orders set forth here would be
beneficial.  For example, to protect the privacy interest, privacy
statutes and government agencies, as well as the courts,
should emphasize limits on data collection rather than merely
repeat historic reliance on post data collection security and
post disclosure liabilities.  In particular, this Article argues that
the need for data gathering limits by government entities is
acute in the age of big data.  Accordingly, this Article suggests a
new cause of action, a type of Pigovian tax, to incent public
entities to limit data collection and protect data retention.
I
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO PROTECT
THE PRIVACY INTEREST
As a general matter, it is difficult to define what exactly a
legal person’s privacy interest is, although extensive literature
has attempted to do so.32  It is especially difficult to define
because each individual, each company, and even each coun-
try may define their own privacy interest in a different way.33
In one home, for example, there may be an attorney with an
incredibly high valuation of personal privacy living with a teen-
age son who has little to no such regard for his personal pri-
vacy.  However, one thing is common to all: once personal
information is disclosed, that privacy is gone forever.34  There-
fore, the following discussion focuses on legal protections for
the informational privacy interest, however that interest may
be defined.
Broadly speaking, the legal framework for privacy interest
protection relies heavily on data disclosure liability and data
32 See, e.g., Victoria Schwartz, Disclosing Corporate Disclosure Policies, 40
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 497–505 and accompanying footnotes (discussing “privacy
interests as a potential cost of a disclosure policy, or something to be considered
as a competing consideration against the disclosure interest”).
33 See, e.g., Factsheet on the “Right to be Forgotten” Ruling, (C-131/12), EUR.
COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/fact-
sheet_data_protection_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/K63T-K86N] (last visited Aug. 7,
2016) (explaining a Court of Justice of the European Union ruling on data
privacy).
34 See William G. Childs, When the Bell Can’t Be Unrung: Document Leaks
and Protective Orders in Mass Tort Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 565, 579 (2008) http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1971794 [https://perma.cc/
53HB-E6MM].
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collection security measures (the analog version to cyber-
security).  These regimes were developed largely before the exis-
tence of the Internet and are showing their age.  As will be
discussed below, the added value of heightened privacy interest
legal protections35—whether by constitutional, statutory, or
tort regimes—are the incentives such protections create for
entities to limit data collection in the first instance and to in-
vest in post-collection data protection systems, thereby creat-
ing a self-disciplining privacy protection market.36  Yet, this
may not be the case in all instances, especially if a government
entity is the information collector.37  Due to the unique coercive
nature of government requests for data, and the unique risks
associated with government-held data, government entities are
particularly likely to overcollect data and underinvest in data
protection.38
A. Constitutional Protection for Informational Privacy
Rights
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether a
legal person has a right of informational privacy.  Informational
privacy is not the same as decisional privacy, which the Su-
preme Court deemed a fundamental right over fifty years ago in
Griswold v. Connecticut.39  Decisional privacy is the fundamen-
tal right of individuals to exercise “independence in making
35 There are also strong reputational effects that can incent investment in
privacy-protection regimes.  See infra subpart I.C.
36 Vice president of global cybersecurity at CGI Group, John Proctor, said “If
you can’t protect it, don’t collect it.” Christine Wong, Customer Data: If You Can’t
Protect It, Don’t Collect It, Says Cyber Security Expert, IT BUS. (Feb. 25, 2016),
https://www.itbusiness.ca/news/customer-data-if-you-cant-protect-it-dont-col-
lect-it-says-cyber-security-expert/65756 [https://perma.cc/N65H-A7XR].
37 See Jennifer A. Brobst, Reverse Sunshine in the Digital Wild Frontier: Pro-
tecting Individual Privacy Against Public Records Requests for Government
Databases, 42 N. KY. L. REV. 191, 195 (2015).
38 See Hal Scott & John Gulliver, The SEC Plans to Collect Too Much Informa-
tion, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-sec-plans-to-
collect-too-much-information-1506983751 [https://perma.cc/GEZ2-6E89]
(describing the new plan by the SEC requiring the U.S. stock exchanges and the
FINRA to establish a database of “the names, birth dates, Social Security numbers
and brokerage accounts of tens of millions of U.S. investors” by November 2018).
The October 2017 announcement of the SEC to expand the Consolidated Audit
Trail and collect more sensitive personal information of investors came only a
month after the SEC announced that its EDGAR database had been hacked in
2016. See Dave Michaels, SEC Discloses Edgar Corporate Filing System was
Hacked in 2016, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-
discloses-edgar-corporate-filing-system-was-hacked-in-2016-1505956552
[https://perma.cc/XF6Y-ZJAS].
39 See 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965).
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certain kinds of important decisions.”40  In contrast, informa-
tional privacy is “the freedom from having private affairs made
public by the government.”41  The Court has danced with the
right of informational privacy on three separate occasions, but
in each case the Court merely assumed without deciding that
such a right did receive constitutional protection.42  Further-
more, rather than applying a specified level of scrutiny to the
state actions at issue in those cases, the Court applied “a bal-
ancing test to determine the scope of the right by weighing the
individual interest in privacy against the government’s interest
. . . .”43  As explained in more detail below, since the Court has
given considerable weight in this balancing test to the “protec-
tions” provided by statute—protections that are questionable
at best and vaporware at worst—the Court’s balance is of little
comfort to the privacy concerned.  In the absence of clear Su-
preme Court precedent, nearly all circuits have recognized a
constitutional right to informational privacy, with only the D.C.
Circuit expressing skepticism that the right exists.44  However,
even the circuits that recognize the right are split on their ap-
proach to two issues: 1) the level of scrutiny to apply when the
right is infringed and 2) what type of information triggers the
right.
As to the level of scrutiny to apply when the right to infor-
mational privacy is infringed, most courts apply some degree of
intermediate scrutiny,45 while a minority apply strict scru-
tiny,46 and at least one applies a varying level of scrutiny de-
40 Caleb A. Seeley, Once More unto the Breach: The Constitutional Right to
Informational Privacy and the Privacy Act, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1355, 1359 n.25 and
accompanying text (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977)).
41 Id. at 1360.
42 See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011). (“In two cases decided more
than 30 years ago, this Court referred broadly to a constitutional privacy ‘interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.’ . . . We assume, without deciding, that
the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in Whalen and
Nixon.” (internal citations omitted)). See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599–600 (1977); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977).
43 Seeley, supra note 40, at 1360–61. R
44 Leading Cases, 125 HARV. L. REV. 172, 237 nn.68–69 and accompanying
text (2011).
45 See In re Crawford, 194 F.3d. 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999) (requiring only a
legitimate government interest but also requiring narrow tailoring of the regula-
tion); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1994) (requiring a
substantial government interest and using a balancing test to evaluate the
regulation).
46 See Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 915 (10th Cir. 2006); Bloch v. Ribar,
156 F.3d 673, 686 (6th Cir. 1998).
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pending on the sensitivity of the information at issue.47  As to
the type of information that triggers the right to informational
privacy, some circuits only extend protection to information
concerning “another constitutional right or fundamental liberty
interest,”48 and other circuits extend protection “to any infor-
mation in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.”49  If courts determine that keeping personal, sensitive
information private is a fundamental right, then that data may
be legally well protected.  If, by contrast, it is considered simply
an important right, it will be less protected.  In the latter case
the government need only show the court that it has a “sub-
stantial state interest” in collecting or disseminating the data.50
Arguably, a “substantial state interest” for disclosing data
has been declared in the Federal Freedom of Information Act51
(FOIA) and its state counterparts, colloquially called “sunshine
laws.”52  Sunshine laws provide citizens access to public
records to ensure government transparency and good behav-
ior.53  However, “the stated policy of Sunshine laws [ ] to ‘pro-
vide[ ] for liberal access to public records’ is a double-edged
sword when public records primarily contain information on
private individuals rather than information on government offi-
cials.”54  In other words, the personally identifying information
held in those public records is disclosed along with relevant
data of government action—the personal data exposure is col-
lateral damage to FOIA goals, and citizens cannot protect
against it.
As one author puts it, “what is occurring is a Reverse Sun-
shine effect, in which the lives of individuals, at times, are
made more transparent than government action.”55  Addition-
ally, there is a “strong presumption in favor of disclosure,”
47 See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 580–82 (3d
Cir. 1980).
48 Leading Cases, supra note 44, at 238. See Bloch 156 F.3d at 683–84. R
49 Leading Cases, supra note 44, at 238. See Doe v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 R
F.3d 1133, 1138 (3d Cir. 1995).
50 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 573 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
51 The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).
52 See Brobst, supra note 37, at 196–97. R
53 This is Brandeis’ “sunshine as disinfectant” regime—disclosure of govern-
ment activity increases transparency and accountability. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS,
OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914) (“Publicity is justly
commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.  Sunlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants; electric light the efficient policeman.”).
54 Brobst, supra note 37, at 197–98. R
55 Id. at 191.
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which “places the burden on the agency to justify the withhold-
ing of any requested documents” or “the redaction of identify-
ing information in a particular document[ ].”56  To make
matters worse, an individual requesting a public record does
not necessarily have to justify his or her request because Sun-
shine laws are concerned with promoting government trans-
parency and not with what the public does with the
information.57
Counter to government information disclosures, the Pri-
vacy Act of 197458 was passed to give citizens a cause of action
against the government when their information is disclosed.
As discussed in the next section, the Privacy Act’s efficacy has
been limited by its judicial interpretation and application.
B. Statutory Protections for Informational Privacy Rights
Ironically, the judicial application of the Privacy Act of
1974 exemplifies how far the pendulum has swung away from
protecting the privacy interest.  This statute, like many privacy
statutes, was imagined, drafted, and passed before the exis-
tence of the Internet.59  Rather than focusing ex ante on mini-
mal data collection, this statute emphasizes protecting data
once it has been accumulated.60  In turn, this statutory em-
phasis on post-data collection arguably has heavily influenced
the privacy focus of the judiciary.61
The Privacy Act of 1974 is often criticized by legal scholars
as resulting in the overcollection of personal data and in very
limited liability for noncompliance.62  Admittedly, the Privacy
Act’s purpose is noble in theory but toothless in practice due to
56 Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991).
57 See Brobst, supra note 37, at 201. R
58 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018).
59 See Erin Corken, The Changing Expectation of Privacy: Keeping Up with the
Millennial Generation and Looking Toward the Future, 42 N. KY. L. REV. 287,
295–303 (2015) (providing a chronological list of the most significant information
and privacy-concerned statutes, their purposes, and what has changed about the
world since each statute’s inception).
60 See Wade A. Schilling, You Want to Know What? NASA v. Nelson and the
Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy in an Ever-Changing World, 82 UMKC
L. REV. 823, 834 (2014).
61 See Seeley, supra note 40, at 1364 (discussing that the Supreme Court R
heavily considered statutory protections of personal information when balancing
the individual’s interest in keeping information private against the government’s
interest in collecting the information).
62 See e.g., Alex Kardon, Damages Under the Privacy Act: Sovereign Immunity
and a Call for Legislative Reform, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 705, 767 (2011)
(explaining the difficulties of recovering for so-called “nonpecuniary damages”
under judicial interpretation of the term “actual damages” in the Privacy Act).
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statutory exceptions and judicial interpretations that narrow
the statute’s applicability to claims of noncompliance.63  The
Privacy Act requires federal agencies to: 1) ask the private indi-
vidual for written consent to disclose personal information; 2)
allow the private individual to review and correct the informa-
tion; 3) regulate and restrict the collection, use, and dissemina-
tion of information; and 4) waive sovereign immunity.64
However, there are a dozen exceptions to the first require-
ment, the broadest of which, the “routine use” exception, al-
lows for nonconsensual disclosure if the purpose for disclosure
aligns with the purpose of collection.65  Use of this exception is
claimed to have “led to the over collection of information” be-
cause agencies “fail[ ] to assess the relevance or need of such
information.”66  The Supreme Court held that the Privacy Act
sufficiently protected against unwarranted dissemination,67
but, as one critic argues, that holding “ignore[s] the reality that
abuse of the ‘routine use’ exemption is all too common.”68  In
fact, it was reported that 18% of “routine use” disclosures were
not even reviewed to validate the exception.69
But that clear noncompliance faces little consequence
based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Privacy
Act’s liability provisions.  The Privacy Act states that when an
agency violates the Privacy Act “in a manner which was inten-
tional or willful,” the affected individual may recover for the
sum of “actual damages sustained by the individual as a result
of the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to
recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000” and “the costs of
the action together with reasonable attorney fees as determined
by the court.”70  The Supreme Court held, however, that the
$1,000 statutory minimum is only available where the plaintiff
sustained actual damages totaling less than $1,000.71  Moreo-
ver, in a later case, the Court held that emotional distress
damages were not “actual damages” within the meaning of the
statute and only economic damages sufficed.72
63 Id.
64 Schilling, supra note 60, at 833. R
65 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (2018).
66 Schilling, supra note 60, at 834. R
67 See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 136–37 (2011).
68 Schilling, supra note 60, at 835. R
69 Id.
70 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2018).
71 Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 616 (2004).
72 FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 304 (2012).
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These narrow interpretations combined effectively declaw
the Privacy Act by limiting the situations that result in negative
consequences for noncompliance.  Not only would a plaintiff
have to prove that the agency’s noncompliance was intentional
or willful, but the plaintiff must also prove that they suffered
actual, economic damages as a result of the noncompliance.
As a result, there is little incentive to comply with the Privacy
Act because the agencies face few to no penalties.  Ultimately,
this statute, designed to protect against the disclosure of per-
sonal information, instead allows for excessive disclosure,
overcollection, and little enforcement.
C. Tort Regime—A Private Solution to Protecting Privacy?
As an alternative to constitutional and statutory regimes to
protect privacy, one common solution is to employ a tort regime
to bring about optimal solutions.  The advantage is that the tort
regime can create private markets to lead to optimal invest-
ments in privacy protections by incentivizing either limited col-
lection or increased cybersecurity investments.  The potential
impacts of tort regimes on private and public collectors of data
are different, however, and are modeled separately in the dis-
cussion below.
The need for tort liability in privacy protection rests on the
assumption that the recipients of personal information do not
have the same incentives to protect that information as do the
providers of personal information.  For example, make the
plausible assumption that the California Department of Educa-
tion in Morgan Hill is not motivated to protect student informa-
tion to the degree many parents would protect it.73  The
problem is a common one—the benefits (or costs) of the deci-
sion maker are not aligned with the benefits (or costs) of all
those affected by the decisions.  In the privacy context, this
means that the recipient of information is not as incentivized to
provide privacy protections—vigorous legal defense to discov-
ery or cybersecurity investment against hacking—as the infor-
mation provider may desire.  This misalignment of incentives
means that the information recipient may make decisions for
which it does not suffer negative consequences.  The result is
73 Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Educ., Schools Chief Tom Torlakson Applauds
Federal Court Order Strengthening Student Privacy Protections in Morgan Hill
Case (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.cde.ca.gov/nr/ne/yr16/yr16rel18.asp [https:/
/perma.cc/U48Y-JWBZ] (stating that a “large number of objections to the poten-
tial release of student data” were submitted by parents to keep the CDE from
disclosing it).
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that the information recipient may underinvest in protection
and defense of that information.
To align the incentives of the information recipient and the
information provider, the economic response is to internalize
the externality.74  In this instance, the information recipient
must somehow bear the negative consequences of under pro-
tection.  A typical method is to impose tort liability and award
monetary damages.  However, the problem with tort law in this
particular instance is twofold.  First, a tort regime designed to
protect the privacy interests of a population with highly diverse
privacy concerns will inevitably overprotect some individuals
and underprotect others.  Second, a private tort system is lim-
ited against public (government) collectors of information.  The
latter point is particularly important and is discussed at
greater length below.  In general, due to the coercive nature of
government collection of data, privacy concerns are heightened
because an individual has a limited ability to self-protect his or
her privacy by opting out of information mandates.
Nevertheless, the theory behind tort law is simple:  if a
victim suffers an injury due to the negligent behavior of the
tortfeasor, then the tortfeasor must compensate the victim.75
The compensation may include direct damages (such as medi-
cal expenses for a physical injury), consequential damages
(that flow from the injury, such as lost wages) and punitive
damages (meant to punish).76  The damage calculation is in-
tended not only to put the victim in the position he or she
would have been in but for the negligence, but also to incen-
tivize the tortfeasor and potential tortfeasors to exercise greater
care in similar future situations.77  Industry participants that
may face potential liability invest in procedures to minimize
tort exposure.78  In the case of privacy it would mean that the
information recipient would perhaps invest in legal and cyber
defense to protect the information if the release would lead to
penalty.
74 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 196 (8th ed. 2016) (“In-
stead of regulating behavior in response to an externality, the government can use
market–based policies to align private incentives with social efficiency.  For in-
stance, . . .  the government can internalize the externality by taxing activities that
have negative externalities . . . .”).
75 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
76 See id. at §§ 903–909.
77 See id. at § 901.
78 See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort
Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 314 (1990) (noting the increasing
adoption of negligence insurance policies).
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As a corollary, the tort regime may encourage the develop-
ment of private insurance markets to protect the insured
against potential liabilities.  Not only does such a market bene-
fit victims by providing funding in the face of loss, the secon-
dary benefits are the salutary effects of insurance premiums,
deductibles, and contractual obligations of care imposed by the
private market.  These costs, if properly set, may further incen-
tivize protection investments.  The development of such mar-
kets takes time.  Insurance markets develop to counter known
risks; the greater the uncertainty of the risks, the less likely
insurance will be available at reasonable rates.  Even without
insurance markets, a company may decide to self-insure
against uncertain tort liability.79  This self-insurance may con-
vey similar benefits to consumers as do private insurance
markets.
The optimal insurance regime is difficult to create in any
market.  The first step is to set the tort liability optimally in
order to inspire sufficient self-insurance and insurance market
development.  The second step is for the self-insurer or insur-
ance market to translate that risk into the desired protection of
the privacy interests.  To illustrate, let x be an individual with
high regard for the privacy interest and y be a person with low
concern for the privacy interest.  Let Q represent likelihood of
entry into a privacy exchanging transaction.  Assume also that
an increase in overall transactions is a societal “good” and that
tort liability leads to insurance markets and is represented by
ø.
1. Privacy Tort Regimes—Private Sector Transactions
Scenario 1: Voluntary Transactions without Tort
Liability.
(a) Transaction bears no privacy revelation risk.
x Q = y Q
x and y are equally likely to enter the transaction.  No tort
liability is necessary and no insurance or investment is needed
to increase the number of transactions.
(b) Transaction bears slight to medium privacy revelation
risk.
x Q < y Q
79 See Mark W. Flory & Angela Lui Walsh, Know Thy Self-Insurance (And Thy
Primary and Excess Insurance), 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 1005, 1010 (2001).
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x’s enthusiasm for the transaction is less than y’s enthusiasm
for the transaction.  x would be less likely to enter the transac-
tion than y.
Scenario 2: Voluntary Transactions with Tort Liability
As evidenced in Scenario 1, increased investment in pro-
tections or a lower information requirement would help x enter
the transaction.  An increase in tort liability might incentivize
such investment.  However, the existence of tort liability may
also discourage a transaction offering in the first instance, thus
decreasing the number of transactions.  The preferable societal
solution is therefore ambiguous.  It will depend on whether x’s
decision to self-protect by opting out is better for society than
trying to encourage x’s entry by a tort regime.  There are two
possible outcomes:
(a) (x Q < y Q)  <  (x Q ø =  y Q)  Tort regime maximizes
transactions.
(b) (x Q < y Q)  >  (x Q ø =  y Q)  Tort regime does not maximize
(may decrease) transactions.
Again, whether the intervention of a tort regime will result
in greater transactions will depend on (1) how many individuals
would opt out of the transaction without a tort regime in place
as opposed to (2) the decrease in offered transactions because
the tort regime has increased costs.  In this theoretical exam-
ple, it follows that a tort regime would be more effective in
increasing transactions when the risks of revelation (or poten-
tial damage from revelation) are high.
Importantly, private collectors of information may have an
incentive to protect collected information even in the absence of
tort law.  Many companies invest tremendous sums in their
brand or reputation, which may be at risk if an unwanted
disclosure of private information occurs.80  If the company is
susceptible to “brand risk” in the area of privacy, they may
already have private insurance or privacy policies that incen-
80 My thanks to Professor Thomas W. Hazlett, the Hugh H. Macaulay En-
dowed Professor of Economics at Clemson University and Director of the Informa-
tion Economy Project, for suggesting the exploration of this issue. See Pat
Conroy, et al., Building Consumer Trust: Protecting Personal Data in the Consumer
Product Industry, DELOITTE U. PRESS (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/
insights/us/en/topics/risk-management/consumer-data-privacy-strategies
.html [https://perma.cc/T7N5-JBAG] (“The results of a recent survey of consum-
ers and executives show that consumers have a keen sense of awareness of the
risks surrounding data security and privacy, and that many consumer product
executives are likely overestimating the extent to which they are meeting con-
sumer expectations related to data privacy and security.”).
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tivize protections of client data.81  Such brand risk may not
apply to all collectors equally, but there is evidence that even
data collectors that do not have a direct relationship with con-
sumers may experience drops in their stock value if consumer
information is not protected properly.82  The importance of
brand risk cannot be underestimated.  Unlike tort law which is
costly, imperfect, and necessitates articulating an actual
harm—difficult in privacy invasion cases—brand risk is felt
immediately in stock value loss and decreases in demand.
Brand risk is also much more responsive to changes in con-
sumer privacy preferences than is tort law, since the latter may
change only with new legislation or the development of case
law.
2. Privacy Tort Regimes—Public Sector Transactions
As a starting observation, public sector transactions are
not necessarily “voluntary” in the classic, common law sense of
that word.  For example, even a privacy-conscious individual
cannot “opt out” of filing financial information with the IRS.
Given the asymmetry of bargaining power between an individ-
ual and a monopolistic (or relatively monopolistic) government
entity, most individuals are captive to the privacy selection
made by the government.  Under a liberal framework, however,
reasonable freedom depends on “the presence of alternatives,
between which one may choose.”83  Therefore, while the sup-
posed contract between the government and individuals may
be voluntary in the most technical of circumstances, the prob-
lem is that there is no bargained-for exchange, and essentially
no freedom to negotiate or reveal preferences by exercising
alternatives.
To expand further, it may be argued that at least in some
cases, individual x can opt out by simply choosing not to par-
81 There is evidence of considerable corporate costs related to a company’s
missteps on consumer privacy issues.  Corporations that have experienced such
costs include ChoicePoint, Google and Facebook. See Jessica Rich, FTC, PRIVACY
TODAY AND THE FTC’S 2014 PRIVACY AGENCY 3–4 (2013) https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-today-ftcs-2014-privacy-
agency/131206privacytodayjrich.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5PL-H2NK].
82 See id. (noting that ChoicePoint lost value in the market even though it was
a third-party data seller).  See generally Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti,
Selling Cookies, 7 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 259, 259 (2015), http://www.mit
.edu/~bonatti/selling_cookies.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL5U-3QVJ] (modeling the
price of data).
83 George Kateb, Foreword to JUDITH N. SHKLAR, POLITICAL THOUGHT & POLITICAL
THINKERS, at xvii (Stanley Hoffmann ed., U. Chi. Press, 1998); see Judith N. Sh-
klar, The Liberalism of Fear, reprinted in SHKLAR, supra, at 3–20.
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ticipate in a government benefit if it would pose an unaccept-
able exposure of private information.  For example, x could
enroll her school-aged children in a private school that protects
information more vigorously than does a public school.  There
are of course many obvious problems with viewing such an
action as “voluntary” or “socially optimal.”  To encourage tax-
payers to forgo public benefits to protect privacy interests
seems extreme.  It is at a minimum highly inefficient, but also
raises equity issues as such an “opt out” is generally available
only to the wealthy.  In short, the absence of a viable opt-out
option limits the ability of privacy-conscious individuals to self-
protect by declining to engage in the transaction.  The result
will be overparticipation in public sector transactions that
carry a high risk to privacy.
Scenario 3: Involuntary Transactions without Tort
Liability.
(a) Transaction bears zero privacy revelation risk.
x Q = y Q
(b) Transaction bears low to medium privacy revelation risk.
x Q = y Q
(c) Transaction bears medium to high privacy revelation risk.
x Q = y Q
In Scenario 3, by government mandate, x and y must enter
the transaction; opting out (self-protection) is not an option.
Unless privacy exposure risk is zero, that means that x is enter-
ing into a transaction that under private circumstances she
would not have entered.  Hence, in this Scenario 3, the number
of transactions is greater than the privacy-protecting social op-
timum.  The most privacy-concerned individuals are forced to
engage in the transaction even when they would normally opt
out or require additional protections to voluntarily opt in.  This
is a quintessential contract of coercion so that privacy prefer-
ences are unrevealed.  The result is that government entities
are not properly incentivized to gather the least amount of in-
formation necessary, nor are they incentivized to invest in pri-
vacy protection regimes or vigorously defend against discovery
requests.  The entire cost of privacy loss is borne by the individ-
ual information providers, even unwilling providers.
In this scenario, the presence of a tort regime will not in-
crease transaction participation.  Here, the social goal must be
defined distinctly from that in the private sector (voluntary)
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transaction context—the internalization of third-party inter-
ests should lead to a decrease of transactions.
Scenario 4: Involuntary Transactions with Tort
Regimes
(x Q = y Q)  <  (x Q ø = y Q)  Tort regime minimizes unneces-
sary transactions.
As discussed next, tort regimes in the public context are
extremely complex.  And there is no brand risk in the public
context that in the absence of tort liability will still encourage
privacy protection investment.
3. Tort Liability for Government Entities
The path to suing the government, whether federal or state,
is littered with obstacles.  The first obstacle, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, can eliminate a plaintiff’s tort claims.
Under the doctrine, “[t]he United States, as sovereign, is im-
mune from suit [unless] it consents to be sued . . . .”84  Federal
sovereign immunity is derived not from the Constitution but
from our English ancestry and its extensive history in English
law.85  Sovereign immunity extends to the states through the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.86  Ac-
cordingly, in order to sue a government entity, that entity (fed-
eral or state) must waive its sovereign immunity.87
The federal government waived its sovereign immunity to
tort claims in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).88  However,
that waiver is not absolute and is subject to many exceptions.89
“The most sweeping of these exceptions bars claims ‘based
upon the exercise or performance [of] or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty.’”90  Courts none-
theless recognize that a plaintiff can sue for the wrongful dis-
84 United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
85 See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205–06 (1882).
86 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (providing that citizens of one state cannot sue
another state).
87 See Lee, 106 U.S. at 227.
88 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2018).
89 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2018); Jonathan R. Bruno, Immunity for “Discretion-
ary” Functions: A Proposal to Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act, 49 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 411, 411–12 (2012).
90 Bruno, supra note 89, at 412 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). R
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closure of private information91 despite the broad
“discretionary” exception.92
Although the law is clear that a private plaintiff is allowed
to sue the federal government for wrongful disclosure, a poten-
tial claimant faces other legal roadblocks.  In order to sue
under the FTCA, the plaintiff must first exhaust administrative
remedies with the appropriate agency.93  The request for ad-
ministrative relief must include: (1) a written statement of the
injury and (2) a “sum-certain damages claim.”94  Then, the
plaintiff can only bring a lawsuit in court if the agency denies
the claim for relief or if the agency fails to respond to the claim
within six months of its submission.95
Yet another hurdle lies on the path to a tort suit: the stat-
ute of limitations.  In fact, there are two statutes of limitations
relevant to a federal tort claim.  First, a tort claim needs to be
filed with the appropriate agency within two years of the claim’s
accrual.96  Second, once an agency has formally denied a
claim, the plaintiff has six months from notice of that denial to
file the action in court.97  If either of these time limitations
expires, the plaintiff is forever barred from pursuing the
claim.98  With these obstacles, few plaintiffs actually have their
day in court against a government agency under the FTCA.
It is worth noting that the FTCA is not the only statute that
allows a private citizen to file suit against the government for
negligent disclosure.  As discussed in Part I, the Privacy Act of
91 See, e.g., Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 722–24 (5th Cir. 1995) (United
States sued for disclosing tax information); Boyd v. United States, 932 F. Supp. 2d
830 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (Veterans Affairs sued for disclosing medical information);
Martin v. Locke, 659 F. Supp. 2d 140, 143 (D.D.C. 2009) (officers of the Secretary
of Commerce sued for disclosing “private facts”).
92 See Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1252–53 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (explaining that the discretionary function exception only applies if the
action being challenged passes a two-part test).
93 See Martin, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 151–52.
94 Id.
95 See McCallister v. United States, 925 F.2d 841, 843–44 (5th Cir. 1991). Cf.
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2018) (“A tort claim against the United States shall be forever
barred unless . . .  action is begun within six months after the date of mailing . . .
of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.”).
96 See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2018); see also Myszkowski v. United States Gov’t,
553 F. Supp. 66, 67–68 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
97 Myszkowski, 553 F. Supp. at 68. (“In our view, § 2401(b) provides that tort
claimants filing suit against the United States can be barred by the statute of
limitations in two ways: (1) they can be barred if they do not file a claim with the
appropriate federal agency within two years; or (2) they can be barred even if they
do file a timely administrative claim, but fail to file a suit in district court within
six months after final notice of the agency’s action on their claim.”).
98 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2018).
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1974 also provides a private cause of action to people who have
had their information wrongfully disclosed.  Unlike the FTCA,
the Privacy Act does not require a plaintiff to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies with an agency.99  Instead, a plaintiff can file
suit in a district court immediately.  However, the Privacy Act
has its own broad list of exceptions,100 and the Supreme Court
has limited a plaintiff’s recovery in cases of intentional wrong to
“actual damages,”101 thereby preventing a plaintiff from recov-
ering non-economic damages.  On the other hand, the FTCA
allows a plaintiff to recover the same types of damages from the
government that would be recovered from a private defen-
dant—including emotional distress and punitive damages.102
It is arguably harder for a plaintiff to sue a state govern-
ment.  Because this Article uses Morgan Hill as a cautionary
tale for the privacy-concerned, this Article focuses on a plain-
tiff’s ability to sue the State of California.  Like the federal gov-
ernment, California has sovereign immunity unless a statute
expressly abrogates its sovereign immunity.103  California Gov-
ernment Code section 815.6 extends tort liability to a public
entity “[w]here [the] public entity is under a mandatory duty
imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against
the risk of a particular kind of injury[.]”104  This section is basi-
cally a parallel to the FTCA’s “discretionary function” excep-
tion.  The duty must be imposed by statute, and whether it is
mandatory or discretionary is a question of law.105  Accord-
ingly, the plaintiff must first prove that the public entity’s duty
is mandatory before proceeding to prove their primary cause of
action.
In the context of Morgan Hill, a private third party would
have to first determine whether the California Department of
Education (DOE) had a mandatory duty to protect the third
party’s education records.106  Arguably, California Education
99 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (2018) (providing that individuals may
bring a civil action against the offending agency).
100 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)–(12) (2018).
101 FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 287 (2012).
102 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2018).
103 See Tuthill v. City of San Buenaventura, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 820, 827 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2014); Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co., 205 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 815 (West 2016) (providing that a public entity
is not liable for injury unless a statute provides otherwise).
104 GOV’T § 815.6 (emphasis added).
105 See Tuthill, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 828 (quoting Haggis v. City of Los Angeles,
93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 327, 333 (Cal. 2000)).
106 Cf. Nunn v. State of California, 35 Cal. 3d 616, 624 (1984) (requiring a
plaintiff to prove a mandatory duty as a threshold inquiry).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-5\CRN501.txt unknown Seq: 26 27-AUG-18 15:34
1126 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:1101
Code § 49076 provides such a duty.107  According to the stat-
ute, “[a] school district shall not permit access to pupil records
to a person without written parental consent or under judicial
order” unless an exception applies.108  Alternatively, although
FERPA does not provide a private cause of action, it imposes a
similar mandatory duty and may also serve as a basis for tort
liability under § 815.6.109
Next, the third party would have to determine whether the
DOE breached that mandatory duty.  This is where the third
party runs into an impenetrable obstacle: the DOE is protected
by a judicial order exception under both statutes.110  Because
the DOE disclosure of the approximately ten million student
records is pursuant to a judicial order, it cannot be claimed
that the DOE breached its duty to any of those students, and
none of those students would have a viable claim under section
815.6.111
4. Judicial Orders and Tort Regime Goals
The question of this Article remains: given that judicial
orders may provide legal cover for those who disclose third
party information, can a tort regime incentivize socially optimal
protections for the privacy-concerned in the face of a judicial
order?  The quick answer is, unlikely.  Again, the definition of
socially optimal in this context may vary between the private
and government context but only slightly.  In the private con-
text, the socially optimal level of privacy protection would be a
legal defense that limits discovery and risk of revelation to the
degree necessary to maximize transactions.
Tort exposure, however, is arguably less effective in this
context than brand risk.  Tort liability is limited when the prox-
imate cause of liability flows from a judicial order.  As a practi-
cal matter, to the extent that the judicial order may reduce
transactions (and profit), opportunists may seek out privacy-
sensitive industries and threaten lawsuit.  The higher the po-
tential loss (via brand risk or tort liability) the more likely the
industry is to opt for a settlement even in the face of a frivolous
lawsuit.112  Such settlements can increase industry costs and
107 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49076 (West 2016).
108 Id. (emphasis added).
109 See GOV’T § 815.6 (discussing a public entity’s mandatory duty to protect
against certain injuries).
110 See 20 U.S.C. 1232g(b) (2018); EDUC. § 49076(a).
111 See EDUC. § 49076 (providing for a judicial order exception).
112 See generally G. Nicholas Herman, How to Value a Case for Negotiation and
Settlement, 31 MONT. LAW. 5, 22 (2005) (“The foregoing methods of valuation
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reduce transactions.113  To the extent, however, that the judici-
ary functions as an active gatekeeper of discovery decisions,
the court can minimize these costs and by extension increase
socially desirable transactions.
The problem is exacerbated in the government entity con-
text, where there is no brand risk and only limited tort liability
to incentivize protection of third-party interests.  In such con-
texts, the judiciary serves an essential gatekeeper role that
cannot be abrogated—there is no party, no law, and no alterna-
tive incentivizing regime that can fill that role.  It is precisely
this type of scenario that the judicial advisory committee ar-
guably anticipated in its revision of Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.114
II
PROTECTING THE PRIVACY INTEREST
Even in a perfect, privacy-protected world (i.e. the privacy
right is legislatively articulated and tort liability is optimal), the
judicial order exemption in such statutes makes the role of the
judiciary as gatekeeper and protector of the privacy interest
irreplaceable.115  As set forth below, the rules of procedure and
the judicial protective order are but two means by which courts
have protected the privacy interest.  It is time, however, for the
courts to fully employ the discretion afforded them in Rule 26
and to adopt greater protections for the privacy interest than
the traditional protective order.
A. Rules of Discovery—Then and Now
The privacy interest is not a new concept to the American
judiciary.  Indeed, for more than eighty years, courts have rec-
ognized the burden imposed on private parties when their per-
sonal, private information is disclosed as part of a discovery
request.116  As has long been the case, litigants file motions for
largely assume that the client’s decision to settle or go to trial will be made solely
on the basis of which course of action will yield the best result from a rote
economic standpoint.  However, choosing between settlement and trial is not
purely an economic process.”).
113 See Eliot Martin Blake, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis
and Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 408 (1988).
114 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) advisory committee’s note to the 1983 amendment
(“Concern about discovery abuse has led to widespread recognition that there is a
need for more aggressive judicial control and supervision.”).
115 See supra notes 10–13.
116 See, e.g., Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556, 557 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (limiting the disclosure of personal income tax returns unless “clearly re-
quired in the interests of justice”); Conn. Importing Co. v. Cont’l Distilling Corp., 1
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discovery—plaintiffs specify the class of documents and infor-
mation they believe will assist, directly or indirectly, in proving
or disproving an element of their case.117  It is relatively
costless for plaintiffs to request more than they might need for
two reasons: (1) the information might unexpectedly prove use-
ful or (2) the cost or risk of producing the information might
force the defendant to settle.  The courts have the discretionary
authority to limit the request if, for example, the invasion of
third-party privacy outweighs the evidentiary benefit to the
plaintiff.118  Although courts have always had the authority, in
practice, courts rarely limit discovery on privacy grounds on
their own motion, especially when a litigant (the defendant)
bears the privacy burden—that is, when the information re-
quested is the defendant’s own personal information.119
Courts rationalize (correctly) that the motions for discovery put
the defendant on notice of the desired information, which gives
the defendant the opportunity to object to its disclosure.120  If
the defendant (the information provider in this example) does
not object to the discovery request, then the court will not
object either.121  Even when a party does object to the discovery
request, courts are reluctant to grant the objection and impose
limitations.122
As a result, under the early iterations of Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties could request and be
granted access to extensive data as there was a plausible (even
if tenuous) connection between the information requested and
an element at issue in the case.123  After several decades of
broad discovery orders, the legal community, focusing not on
F.R.D. 190, 193 (D. Conn. 1940) (recognizing that the court has discretion to limit
discovery requests to avoid an undue invasion of privacy).
117 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment
(clarifying that discoverable information covered “not only evidence for use at the
trial but also inquiry into matters in themselves inadmissible as evidence but
which will lead to the discovery of such evidence”).
118 See Stark v. American Dredging Co., 3 F.R.D. 300, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1943)
(citing Conn. Importing Co., 1 F.R.D. at 193).
119 See Conn. Importing Co., 1 F.R.D. at 193 (“[T]he plaintiff on a noticed
hearing has had opportunity to protest against any oppressive invasion of its
privacy.  No such protest has been made . . . .  Thus it is scarcely entitled to the
protection . . . .”).
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 See, e.g., Apco Oil Corp. v. Certified Transp., Inc., 46 F.R.D. 428, 432 (W.D.
Mo. 1969) (denying the objection to the discovery request and ordering the plain-
tiff to answer all of the interrogatories).
123 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507–08 (1947) (affording “broad and
liberal treatment” to discovery rules as long as the information requested is rele-
vant and non-privileged).
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privacy but on the economic burden associated with these re-
quests, demanded reform.124  In 1983, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure imposed a proportionality standard to limit dis-
covery requests.125  Rule 26 was amended to include a list of
factors—buried in subsection (b)(2)(C)(iii)—for courts to bal-
ance when evaluating the proportionality of a discovery request
to the needs of the case.126  Despite the courts’ preexisting
authority to limit discovery based on privacy concerns, the
word “privacy” was curiously absent from this new list of fac-
tors.127  Furthermore, courts rarely applied the amended pro-
portionality factors,128 and when they did, they emphasized the
economic burdens of discovery as the primary limiting
factor.129
As judicial discovery requests intersected with technologi-
cal advancements and the beginnings of the new “Big Data”
era, the legal community cried out again for discovery reform,
citing unreasonably broad discovery requests and mountain-
ous expenses associated with producing the desired discov-
ery.130  In response, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
amended several more times to further empower the courts to
124 See Milton Pollack, Discovery—Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219,
221 (1978) (arguing for discovery reform because the contemporary rules gave
“the parties virtually unlimited management over discovery . . .  limited only by
privilege and relevancy standards.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory com-
mittee’s note to 1983 amendment (justifying the amendment because the contem-
porary discovery abuse resulted in “excessively costly and time-consuming
activities that are disproportionate to the nature of the case, the amount involved,
or the issues or values at stake”).
125 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
126 Id.  The amendment “encourage[d] attorneys to be sensitive to the compar-
ative costs of different methods of securing information” and determined propor-
tionality by evaluating “[the lawsuit’s] nature and complexity, the importance of
the issues at stake in a case seeking damages, the limitations on a financially
weak litigant to withstand extensive opposition to a discovery program or to re-
spond to discovery requests, and the significance of the substantive issues.”
127 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 30 (1984) (“The Rules do
not differentiate between information that is private or intimate and that to which
no privacy interests attach. . . .  Thus, the Rules often allow extensive intrusion
into the affairs of both litigants and third parties.” (footnote omitted)).
128 See Agnieszka A. McPeak, Social Media, Smartphones, and Proportional
Privacy in Civil Discovery, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 235, 252 (2015) (“Despite the Com-
mittee’s express intent to make proportionality a limit on discovery, courts
seemed to under-utilize the proportionality factors.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advi-
sory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
129 See McPeak, supra note 128, at 253 and accompanying text. R
130 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment
(“The information explosion of recent decades has greatly increased both the
potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and the potential for discovery to be used
as an instrument for delay or oppression.”). See also id. at advisory committee’s
note to 2000 amendment.
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restrict discovery and emphasize the proportionality factors.131
Then, in 2015, the proportionality standard and the guiding
factors moved to the forefront of Rule 26(b),132 indicating a
desire to refocus the courts and litigants on limiting discov-
ery.133  In fact, Chief Justice Roberts specifically recognized the
need for the legal community to heed the 2015 amendments
and implement the proportionality test as a best practice for
case management and the pursuit of efficient justice.134  Imple-
mentation and compliance is a two–way street.  On the one
hand, “[j]udges must be willing to take on a stewardship role,
managing their cases from the outset rather than allowing par-
ties alone to dictate the scope of discovery and the pace of
litigation.”135  On the other hand,
lawyers must size and shape their discovery requests to the
requisites of a case.  Specifically, the pretrial process must
provide parties with efficient access to what is needed to
prove a claim or defense, but eliminate unnecessary or
wasteful discovery. The key here is careful and realistic as-
sessment of actual need.136
During the same time frame that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were first amended to limit discovery requests, Con-
gress passed laws to protect certain sensitive information.137
131 In 1993, Rule 26(b) was amended to “enable the court to keep tighter rein
on the extent of discovery.”  In 2000, Rule 26(b)(1) was amended to further limit
party-controlled discovery only to the information that is relevant to the “claim or
defense” of either litigant rather than all information that was relevant to the
“subject matter” of the action.  Nonetheless, the court has the power to order
discovery of all information relevant to the subject matter of the action for good
cause.  In 2006, Rule 26 was amended yet again to address issues of cost and size
associated with the production of electronically stored information, especially
when that information is not reasonably accessible.  Finally, in 2015, Rule 26(b)
was reorganized to place the proportionality test at the beginning of the rule,
signaling a desire for the courts to actually follow the rule and apply the test.
132 The factors were unearthed from the multi-layered subsections of Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) and reorganized into Rule 26(b)(1). FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)
133 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
134 See Roberts, supra note 16, at 6–7. R
135 Id. at 10.
136 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
137 To give a few examples, Congress passed the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA) in 1974 to protect the disclosure of student records.  20
U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(B) (2018). See also Legislative History of Major FERPA Provi-
sions, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. [hereinafter Legislative History], http://www2.ed.gov/
policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/leg-history.html [https://perma.cc/CD6M-N4A7]
(last modified Feb. 11, 2004).
In 1996, Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act (HIPAA) in part to protect patients’ privacy by keeping their medical records
confidential.  42 U.S.C. § 1320d–6 (2018).
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act was passed in 1998 to protect
children’s privacy online while under the age of thirteen. 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2018).
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These laws impose negative consequences for the disclosure of
protected information in the absence of consent or a court or-
der.138  The procedural requirements associated with seeking a
court order essentially imposed a mandatory threshold issue
for the litigants to argue and the courts to consider: whether
the information is more important to the needs of the case than
the privacy protection it currently enjoys.  Understandably,
sometimes the benefit of the information does justify its disclo-
sure—indeed, that is why the judicial order exceptions exist in
the first place—but the legal community has recognized the
importance of reducing that information’s exposure to irrele-
vant parties.139
B. The Protective Order
As set forth above, the primary means by which a court can
protect the privacy interest is to limit discovery in the first
instance.  Once discovery is granted, however, judges often em-
ploy a secondary method to protect the privacy interest—the
protective order.140  Generally, protective orders require that
the information be used only for the case in which it is re-
quested and be accessed only by the requesting party.141  Pro-
tective orders can also be narrowly tailored to limit the scope of
the information requested,142 require the redaction of personal
identifying information,143 and order the return or destruction
of the information once the case closes.144  In the case of
138 See generally Legislative History, supra note 137 (discussing FERPA, HIP- R
PAA, and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act as examples of laws that
penalize illegal disclosure of protected information).
139 Upon motion and a showing of good cause, the court can impose a protec-
tive order on the desired information with various parameters specifying the use
and scope of the information. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).  In cases involving espe-
cially technical discovery, courts can appoint a special master to facilitate the
conveyance of information between parties in a reasonably controlled, protected
medium. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
140 See Haghayeghi v. Guess?, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1281 (S.D. Cal.
2016); Hinsdale v. City of Liberal, Kan., 961 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Kan. 1997), aff’d,
981 F. Supp. 1378 (D. Kan. 1997); United States v. Smith, 602 F. Supp. 388 (M.D.
Pa. 1985), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985); Britt v. Superior Court, 574 P.2d
766 (Cal. 1978); Alch v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
141 See Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., 549 F. Supp. 2d 288,
294–95 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
142 See id.
143 See Music Grp. Macao Commercial Offshore Ltd. v. Foote, No.
14–cv–03078-JSC, 2015 WL 2170121, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2015).
144 See In re C.F., Nos. H12CP08012016A, H12CP08012017A, 2009 WL
455922, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009).  Additionally, destroying docu-
ments is easier said than done in the digital age.  Before e-discovery, documents
could be destroyed by shredding or burning and there would be no backup disk or
flash drive to reverse the destruction.  Presently, digital documents can be re-
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-5\CRN501.txt unknown Seq: 32 27-AUG-18 15:34
1132 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:1101
e-discovery, the protective order even tries to provide some
cybersecurity.  These orders are not foolproof, however, and
cannot replace the initial gatekeeper role of the judge in grant-
ing discovery in the first instance.
Moreover, protective orders are effective only when the sig-
natories comply with their parameters, and even then informa-
tion can be misplaced or disclosed inadvertently.145  The fairly
modern Zyprexa case exemplifies this limitation.146  About
thirty thousand personal injury suits were filed against Eli Lilly
& Company for side effects caused by the pharmaceutical com-
pany’s schizophrenia medication Zyprexa.147  In connection
with those lawsuits, the court issued a protective order that
placed millions of documents under seal to prevent them from
being disclosed to the public.148  However, a reporter, an expert
witness for the plaintiffs, and an outside attorney unrelated to
the Zyprexa lawsuits conspired to disseminate and publish the
documents.149  The protective order provided an exception to
the otherwise prohibited disclosure of any of the documents;
the documents could be turned over if they were subpoenaed
and proper procedures were followed.150  The reporter hatched
the plan, the outside attorney subpoenaed the documents on
false pretenses, and the expert witness transferred the docu-
ments to the attorney.  Millions of confidential, sealed docu-
ments then found their way into the hands of various
organizations and individuals, including the New York Times,
who then disseminated the documents to the public at large.151
Once the court and the Zyprexa litigants heard of the breach,
the court ordered any disseminated documents to be returned
to the special master, but the damage could not be undone.152
stored from external hard drives, flash drives, a cloud storage service, and built-in
backup tools that modern operating systems come equipped with.
145 Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address issues of inadvertent
disclosure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
146 See Childs supra note 34, at 579; In re Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d R
385, 423–25 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
147 See Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. at 391.
148 See Childs, supra note 34, at 579–80. R
149 See Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. at 392 (“To carry out the scheme for
obtaining and disseminating the protected documents, [the attorney] intervened
in a state case in Alaska wholly unrelated to Zyprexa.  In that case, he then
subpoenaed from [the expert witness] confidential documents he knew to be
under the protective order which bore no relevance to the Alaska litigation.  The
subpoenaed documents were sent by [the expert witness to the attorney] pursuant
to an expedited amended subpoena about which Lilly was deliberately kept in the
dark so that it would be unable to make a timely objection.”).
150 Id. at 398.
151 Id. at 392–93.
152 Id. at 393; see also Childs, supra note 34, at 593. R
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Many of the recipients refused to return the documents, while
others had already published them online or in newspapers,
effectively immortalizing the confidential information in the
public domain.153
The protective order was a great security feature in theory,
but its effectiveness was nullified by a nefarious trio, only one
of whom had permission to access the information.154  This
example serves as a cautionary tale of the damage that can be
caused when sensitive information falls into the wrong hands.
Intentional dissemination and inadvertent disclosure were
less of a problem before modern technology when discovery
requests were fulfilled with reams of paper and other tangible
items.  As a practical matter, it was just more difficult to copy
and distribute physical documents before the digital age.  Cor-
recting inadvertent disclosure was as easy as “clawing back”
improperly disclosed documents,155 and protected material
could be inventoried upon return once the case closed.  But
digital storage—despite its intangible nature, firewalls, and
passwords—undermines the primitive, yet more tractable
court protections applied to a ream of paper in a locked filing
cabinet.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure acknowledge the tech-
nicalities associated with the disclosure of electronically stored
information.156  But even highly detailed, technical discovery
plans cannot protect private information with absolute cer-
tainty.  In this day and age, technology has made information
153 See Childs, supra note 34, at 593 (“[T]he litigants . . .  and the court were R
making significant efforts to retrieve the documents––efforts which were . . .
largely futile.”).
154 This case exemplifies the difficulty of drafting and enforcing a protective
order.  The attorney who disseminated the information was not disciplined or
fined for his action because he was not actually bound by the order.  The attorney
received the documents from an expert witness who violated the protective order.
The court did order the attorney to return or destroy any documents he had. See
Zyprexa Injunction, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 429–30.  The lack of penalty for the actual
information disseminator demonstrates the limited power of the protective order.
155 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B) (explaining when information is inadvertently
disclosed to the opposing party, the recipient must return the information to the
disclosing party).  It is much easier to return pieces of paper that have been
reproduced a finite number of times than it is to return a digital document that
may be stored on a recovery drive, forgotten in a trash bin, or hidden in a
download folder.
156 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C) (requiring the parties to meet and confer to estab-
lish a discovery plan that addresses “any issues about disclosure, discovery, or
preservation of electronically stored information, including the form or forms in
which it should be produced”). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s
note to 2006 amendment.
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increasingly accessible,157 more difficult to destroy,158 and eas-
ier to reproduce.159  Furthermore, any entity that houses large
electronic sets of sensitive data is a target for hackers.160  Sev-
eral law firms have recently been victims of cyberattacks be-
cause of their collections of personal identifying information,
trade secrets, and insider knowledge for advantageous stock
market trades.161  To shore up the protective order for modern
day realities, courts must first acknowledge that they cannot
rely solely on the protective order of old to limit the inadvertent
disclosure of sensitive information.  A means to assure protec-
tion is to consider and weigh the affected parties’ privacy inter-
est at every step of the discovery process.
III
PROMOTING CYBERSECURITY
Cybersecurity is a battle that everyone seems to be losing.
Headlines scream out of cyberattacks on private and govern-
mental data sets, and even of government surveillance of digital
troves thought to be private and secure.  It is far beyond the
scope of this Article to discuss the intricate engineering strate-
157 An e-mail address can be accessed from any computer or smart phone with
an internet connection, digital documents can be stored in the cloud or some
other popular storage server like Dropbox, and every time that information is
transmitted from one location to another the sender, recipient, and the intermedi-
ary service all have access to that information.
158 See Joan E. Feldman & Larry G. Johnson, Lost? No. Found? Yes. Those
Computer Tapes and E-mails are Evidence, BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 1999, at
18–22 (discussing various ways to protect data from destruction and how to
recover data that has been destroyed).
159 Id.
160 Banks, hospitals, social media outlets, and government agencies are
among some of the various entities that have been victims of cyber attacks in the
past year alone. See Sy Mukherjee, Hackers Have Crippled Another Major Hospi-
tal Chain with a Cyberattack, FORTUNE (Mar. 29, 2016, 1:18 PM), http://fortune
.com/2016/03/29/hackers-medstar-cyber-attack [https://perma.cc/4CJ5-
APZQ] (discussing a cyberattack on MedStar, which operates 10 hospitals in the
Washington, D.C. area); Riley Walters, Continued Federal Cyber Breaches in
2015, HERITAGE FOUND. (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.heritage.org/cybersecurity/
report/continued-federal-cyber-breaches-2015 [https://perma.cc/S7WX-T5BY]
(discussing government agencies that were breached in 2014 and 2015); How
Cybercriminals Target Social Media Accounts, MCAFEE, https://www.mcafee.com/
us/security-awareness/articles/how-cybercriminals-target-social-media-ac
counts.aspx [https://perma.cc/NUH3-9NRY] (last visited Jun. 27, 2016) (dis-
cussing how and why social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, In-
stagram, and LinkedIn are hacked).
161 See Nicole Hong & Robin Sidel, Hackers Breach Law Firms, Including
Cravath and Weil Gotshal, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2016, 9:14 PM), https://www.wsj
.com/articles/hackers-breach-cravath-swaine-other-big-law-firms-1459293504
[https://perma.cc/K3LN-CTC2] (discussing recent cyberattacks on prominent
law firms).
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gies to keep data truly secure.  It is also beyond the scope of a
generalist jurist hearing yet another discovery request on a
busy day in court.  Therefore, this section examines not engi-
neering and encryption, but the judicial practice of appointing
a special master to handle the more technical intricacies of e-
discovery.
Under the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, special
masters enjoy relatively expansive authority that allows them
to handle various duties determined and consented to by the
parties, hold trial proceedings and make or recommend find-
ings of fact (especially when there is a complex issue regarding
accounting or damages computation), and address certain pre-
trial and posttrial matters that would not be handled effectively
and efficiently by a district court judge.162  However, their au-
thority has evolved considerably over time from humble, nar-
row beginnings as issues became more technical and as civil
dockets became congested with ever-increasing mounds of dis-
covery requests.163
In its initial iteration, Rule 53 allowed special masters to
hear trial testimony and report recommended findings of fact to
the jury when the issues were too complicated for a jury to
digest alone or, where non-jury matters are concerned, when
“exceptional conditions” required the appointment of a special
master.164  Issues were rarely too complex for a jury to address
without the help of a special master, and the Supreme Court
construed “exceptional conditions” narrowly.165  Without
describing a condition that was “exceptional,” the Supreme
Court recognized several conditions that were not exceptional
enough to condone the appointment of a special master.166
Notably, docket congestion, complex litigation issues, and trial
duration were insufficient circumstances to pass the “excep-
tional” analysis.167  Accordingly, special masters were seldom
used when Rule 53 was newly drafted.
In 2003, Rule 53 was amended to its current language,
thus drastically expanding both the circumstances in which a
special master may be appointed and his or her authority in
162 FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a).
163 See Shira A. Scheindlin and Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters and E-
Discovery: The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 348–51 (2008).
164 Id. at 348 n.2 and accompanying text.
165 Id. at 349 n.12 and accompanying text.
166 See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., Inc., 352 U.S. 249, 259 (1957).
167 Id.
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such a circumstance.168  Arguably the most expansive of the
added provisions allows for the appointment of a special
master to “perform duties consented to by the parties.”169  As
long as both parties agree to the appointment and scope of the
special master’s duty then the special master may perform
those duties.170  The rule no longer requires the issue to be too
complex for a jury and no longer requires an “exceptional con-
dition” for the appointment of a special master.  As a result,
special masters have become increasingly prevalent through-
out all types and stages of litigation.171
In this Article, the use of special masters for discovery
management is strongly encouraged.  Courts often consider ap-
pointing a special master when large, electronic data sets are to
be accessed or transferred.  In the Morgan Hill case, for exam-
ple, the court took care to select a special master with cyber-
security credentials—no doubt because of the size and
sensitivity of the data at issue.  But as set forth below, a cyber-
security or industry specialist is not necessarily a privacy inter-
est expert.  This Article encourages judges to be particularly
sensitive to that fact.  So much so that, under specific circum-
stances, the court may want to appoint an additional special
master to specifically monitor and protect the privacy interests
of underrepresented parties.172
168 FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a).
169 FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(A).
170 Id.; see also Scheindlin & Redgrave, supra note 163, at 352 n.26–27 and R
accompanying text.
171 See David Ferleger, Judicial Adjuncts in Disability Rights Litigation, FED.
LAW., Dec. 2012, at 44 (noting that special masters are used more often since the
2003 amendment in “constitutional, commercial, disabilities, mass tort, and
other litigation for assistance at all stages in the adjudication process”).  For
example, in Morgan Hill, the parties agreed to the appointment of a special master
to facilitate “the parties’ development of an electronic discovery protocol.”  Order
at 2:4–9, Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Ass’n v. Cal. Dept. of Educ., No.
2:11–cv–03471–KJM–AC (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2015), ECF No. 116.  The special
master proposed an e-discovery protocol that addressed which databases would
be available to the plaintiffs, which platform e-mails and other network files would
be uploaded so that the plaintiffs may have access to view and search them, how
to sort privileged documents from non-privileged documents, notification of the
disclosure of student records pursuant to FERPA, and various safeguards to be
implemented to further protect the sensitive information from disclosure.  Order
at 1–14, Morgan Hill, No. 2:11–cv–03471–KJM–AC (Nov. 3, 2015), ECF No. 127–1.
172 See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a).
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IV
A NEW DISCOVERY FRAMEWORK: PROTECT, PROMOTE,
THEN PERMIT
One may ask, however, if a judge orders that private data
be handed over, does it not mean the plaintiff needs the data
for its case?  This is an excellent question, and one contem-
plated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  There are limits
to how permissive a court should be in allowing plaintiffs to
gather evidence.  The discovery granted must be “proportional
to the needs of the case.”173  In essence, a plaintiff’s “need” is a
term of art that must be balanced against a defendant’s “costs”
in providing information174—these costs arguably include the
burden to third parties such as parents of California school
children.175  This balancing act has long been the law, but the
language of the statute was recently changed to greater
strengthen the limits judges should place on discovery—in no
event more than needed by the case.176
In particular, third-party interests are difficult to defend in
a court of law because of the cost of intervening in a court
173 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-
privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case . . . .”).
174 See id.  In determining proportionality, the parties and the court need to
consider the following factors: “the importance of the issues at stake in the action,
the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and
whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit.” Id.
175 Historically, courts have considered the financial burden of producing the
requested discovery, but with the abundance of private, sensitive data being
stored in the digital world, some scholars have encouraged the courts to consider
the privacy burden as well. See McPeak, supra note 128, at 235, 288–91.  Indeed, R
some courts have started to do just that. See Appler v. Mead Johnson & Co., No.
3:14–cv–166–RLY–WGH, 2015 WL 5615038, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 24, 2015); see
also Bd. of Trs. v. Cut Bank Pioneer Press, 160 P.3d 482, 487 (Mont. 2007)
(finding FERPA does not prohibit “the public release of redacted records regarding
board disciplinary actions which contain no personally identifiable information”).
176 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
Limiting discovery based on the proportional needs of the case was an idea
adopted back in 1983. Id.  However, over the years, the proportionality require-
ment got buried within the subsections of Rule 26(b) and “the Committee had
been told repeatedly that courts were not using [the] limitations as originally
intended.” Id.  The 2015 Amendment put proportionality and the factors that
determine proportionality at the forefront of the rule to emphasize their signifi-
cance and ensure compliance. Id. The 1983 Committee Note recognized the need
for “greater judicial involvement in the discovery process,” while the 1993 Com-
mittee Note sagaciously observed that “[t]he information explosion of recent de-
cades has greatly increased . . .  the potential cost of wide-ranging discovery . . . .”
Id.  The 1993 Committee’s words ring even more true today in the era of e-
discovery.
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case.177  The judge, of course, is in the most efficient position to
protect third-party interests and eliminate the need for third
parties to incur legal costs.  After all, in some circumstances,
third-party information is at risk only because of the unique
prerogative of the judiciary to compel discovery.  Thus, judges
abdicating their gatekeeper role on privacy issues would im-
pose a monitoring cost and litigation cost on third parties to the
litigation that could be handled directly by special masters and
judges.  As discussed above, defendants do not always have an
incentive to protect third-party privacy interests.178  Therefore,
a general pattern of judicial acquiescence to litigants’ discovery
requests will neither encourage plaintiffs to self-limit discovery
requests nor encourage defendants to invest in privacy protec-
tions.  A passive judiciary in the face of third-party privacy
issues would serve only to increase demand in legal services by
third parties innocently scooped up in the litigation process of
others.
The good news is that the judiciary is beginning to exercise
extreme caution in the face of large, sensitive datasets.179  But
as the Morgan Hill case shows, there is uneven consideration of
the privacy interest in discovery.
A. A Judicial Strategy to Protect Privacy Interests
Presented below is a simple three-step, judicial strategy to
protect the privacy interests of third parties.  The first step is a
177 Although it varies by jurisdiction, the filing fee alone for a motion to inter-
vene could cost hundreds of dollars. See, e.g., Superior Court Filing Fees, MASS.
CT. SYS., https://www.mass.gov/service-details/superior-court-filing-fees
[https://perma.cc/45JY-MVFH] (indicating that it costs $240 to file a Motion to
Intervene as Plaintiff plus a $20 security fee, plus a $15 surcharge).  Beyond that,
attorneys charge hundreds of dollars per hour to represent someone in litigation.
See David Goguen, How, and How Much, Do Lawyers Charge?, LAWYERS.COM,
https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/research/how-and-how-much-do-lawyers-
charge.html [https://perma.cc/JB49-2NHE] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) (“In rural
areas and small towns, lawyers tend to charge less, and fees in the range of $100
to $200 an hour for an experienced attorney are probably the norm.  In major
metropolitan areas, the norm is probably closer to $200 to $400 an hour.”).
178 See supra subpart I.C.
179 See, e.g., Music Grp. Macao Commercial Offshore Ltd. v. Foote, No.
14–cv–03078–JSC, 2015 WL 2170121, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2015) (recognizing
the defendant’s need for the requested documents, but ordering that the re-
quested documents be disclosed with personally identifying information re-
dacted); Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., 549 F. Supp. 2d 288, 294–95
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (limiting the disclosure to a select group of math students and
further limiting the disclosure by redacting all personally identifiable informa-
tion); see also Order, Easton Area Sch. Dist. v. Express Times, No.
C–0048–cv–2011–4775 (Pa. Commw. Ct. April 27, 2011), 2011 WL 8478250 (or-
dering the disclosure of the requested emails but ordering that those emails be
redacted to exclude information protected under FERPA).
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threshold privacy screen to alert judges to cases where the
privacy interests may need the greatest judicial protection.
When a judge is balancing the privacy interest against disclo-
sure, the need to protect the privacy interest is particularly
acute when third parties cannot self-protect (opt out of the
transaction) and cannot pursue tort remedies in the event of
disclosure.  As a threshold analysis, therefore, a judge should
intervene to protect privacy interests in discovery when certain
elements exist because they indicate circumstances when such
rights are least likely to be otherwise protected.180
In addition, the judge should identify which data should be
deemed “personal” or “sensitive.”181  Not all data are equal.
Some data are particularly sensitive so heightened protections
are justified.182  In this first step it is particularly important to
protect data that is of a highly sensitive nature—data that is
simply too-hot-to-handle.  Some too-hot-to-handle data is easy
to identify.  For example, it is broadly accepted that social se-
curity data, trade secrets, and certain financial data may fall
into the highly sensitive category.  Over time, a court might
establish a standard list of the types of third-party information
that would require special treatment and affirmative permis-
sion by a judge (or a special master) to compel.183
The fact that Congress184 itself has decided by statute that
certain data is highly sensitive is a clear indicator that the
courts should narrowly construe the judicial order exception
180 As suggested infra subpart IV.C., under certain circumstances, a judge
may wish to appoint a second special master tasked specifically to monitor pri-
vacy matters.
181 Courts have long experienced dealing with “confidential” information.
Some are well-categorized and protected such as those that enjoy attorney-client
privilege, the spousal privilege, and others.  As used here, “private data” may
include these categories but is much broader in scope.
182 See McPeak, supra note 128, at 260 (highlighting federal statutes that R
specifically protect certain financial information, personal information of minors,
school records, video rental information, information recorded by web service
providers, limiting telemarketing, and medical information).
183 Special thanks to Professor Steven J. Eagle of the Antonin Scalia Law
School at George Mason University for his insights on this point.
184 Congress is not the only body who recognizes the data being asked for is of
a special nature; the Federal Trade Commission—an agency with extensive pri-
vacy and cybersecurity expertise—has express warnings to parents to safeguard
their children’s information.  Indeed, the FTC warning encourages parents to hold
their school districts’ feet to the fire on data gathering and protection.  See Protect-
ing Your Child’s Personal Information at School, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 2012),
http://educationnewyork.com/files/alt056.pdf [https://perma.cc/M299-YDG7]
(encouraging parents to ask for a copy of the school’s policy on surveys, directory
information policy, and to ask who has access to the child’s personal information,
and also encouraging parents to file a complaint with the Department of Educa-
tion when a breach has occurred).  Congress has also directed the FTC to require
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provided in these statutes by asking one simple question: not
only can, but should, the court compel the requested data to be
handed over?
1. Step One—The Privacy Screen
a. Third-party privacy interests are implicated;
b. The privacy interests at stake are identified as a
concern by common law principles or by state or
federal statute (e.g. FERPA); or
c. The defendant (the information collector) is a gov-
ernment entity.
If the privacy screen indicates that third-party privacy in-
terests are potentially threatened, the judge may weigh more
heavily the privacy concerns set forth in Steps Two and Three
below.  As an alternative, the judge may wish to appoint a
second special master tasked specifically to monitor privacy
issues throughout the discovery process.  This “privacy master”
can then advise the judge or the case’s primary special master
on privacy considerations at each stage of discovery and help
balance privacy protections in judicial orders.  The summary of
Steps Two and Three below is followed by more in-depth analy-
ses of each step.
2. Step Two—Protecting the Privacy Interest
a. Demand that data be redacted and/or aggregated to
remove individual identifiers;
b. Determine the least amount of data access that is
“proportional to the needs of the case;”185 and
c. Provide affected individuals an “opt-out” option.
3. Step Three—Promoting Cybersecurity
a. Assign a special master as needed;
b. Limit the number of people with access to the data;
c. Keep data under defendants’ security controls; limit
the electronic transfer and storage of data; and
d. Place data transfers “under seal” and apply protec-
tive orders liberally, but rely on them as warnings
rather than cybersecurity protections.
B. Step Two—Protecting Privacy
The privacy interest considered in Step Two should not be
confused with the cybersecurity concerns discussed in Step
that financial institutions protect consumers’ personal financial information. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09, 6821–27 (2018).
185 Of course this will not eliminate the possibility that determined hackers
can reverse engineer even limited data by matching it to complementary data in
the hackers’ possession.
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Three.  In general, the cybersecurity interest is more concerned
with the inadvertent exposure of data to unauthorized parties
(for example, computer hackers).186  A party’s or third-party’s
privacy interest, in contrast, applies even to the legitimate ex-
posure of data to the requesting party.  For example, in the
Morgan Hill case, third parties have rightfully noted that partic-
ular privacy interest—they question why the plaintiff should
see such detailed information as home addresses, social secur-
ity numbers, and disciplinary records.187  Consideration of
these privacy interests is not only part of a well-crafted judicial
order, but is also well within the judicial wheelhouse.188
Most courts realize the sensitivity of information that can
be disclosed only through judicial order, subpoena, or parental
consent, and seek to limit the scope of the disclosure as much
as possible.189  Many have followed Step Two by placing
thoughtful limits to data disclosures.190  Still, as proved by the
186 Of course the privacy interest and cybersecurity interests are often so
intertwined it is difficult to separate the two.  For example, protecting the privacy
interest in Step One—limiting the data exposed—is the best way to protect data in
the first place.  However, this Article speaks of the privacy interest and cyber-
security interests separately here to focus and simplify the process for the
judiciary.
187 See Letter from Patrick A. Chabot, Superintendent, Sonora Union High
School District, to Kimberly J. Mueller, Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Ass’n v.
Cal. Dep’t of Educ., No. 2:11–cv–03471 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2016), No. 173–1.
188 See infra note 189 and accompanying text.  Ordering for information redac- R
tion seems to be a relatively simple way to assuage those concerns.
189 See, e.g., Music Grp. Macao Commercial Offshore Ltd. v. Foote, No.
14–cv–03078, 2015 WL 2170121, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2015) (recognizing the
defendant’s need for the requested documents, but ordering that the requested
documents be disclosed with personally identifying information redacted); Ragusa
v. Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., 549 F. Supp. 2d 288, 294–95 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(limiting the disclosure to a select group of math students and further limiting the
disclosure by redacting all personally identifiable information); Easton Area Sch.
Dist. v. Express Times, No. C–0048–cv–2011–4775, 2011 WL 8478250 (Pa.
Commw. Ct.  Apr. 27, 2011), aff’d, 41 A.3d 977 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (ordering
the disclosure of the requested emails but ordering that those emails be redacted
to exclude information protected under FERPA).
190 See, e.g., Davids v. Cedar Falls Cmty. Schs., No. C96–2071, 1998 WL
34112767, at *3 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (finding that after conducting a balancing test
in which the privacy interest of the student is weighed against the genuine need of
the party requesting disclosure, disclosure will be ordered when the need for
disclosure outweighs the student’s privacy interest); In re C.F., No.
H12CP08012016A, H12CP08012017A, 2009 WL 455922, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Jan. 26, 2009) (suggesting that the attorneys retained by the third parties, whose
privacy rights could potentially be affected by the outcome of a discovery request,
could be heard on the disclosure issues relative to the proceedings conducted by
the court); Board of Trs. v. Cut Bank Pioneer Press, 160 P.3d 482, 487 (Mont.
2007) (finding that student disciplinary records that have personally identifiable
information redacted would not violate FERPA because they would not be “educa-
tional records” anymore as defined by FERPA).
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breathtaking scope191 and slim regard of third-party privacy
interests192 in the Morgan Hill order, the need to emphasize the
importance of the privacy interest remains.
1. Redact and/or Aggregate Identifying Information
When data must be transferred to the plaintiff, one way to
limit inadvertent, individual exposure is to remove identifying
information.  This is often accomplished by courts ordering
that data be redacted or aggregated.193  This tried and true
brand of judicial protection is still a valuable strategy in today’s
digital world.  However, the court should not be overly confi-
dent in its effectiveness as bits and pieces of information can be
re-aggregated and combined over different data sources to the
ultimate detriment of privacy rights.194  An additional draw-
back is that redacting or aggregating information can be time
consuming and cost prohibitive.  But high costs of redaction or
aggregation should not immediately lead the court to favor re-
lease of unredacted or disaggregated data.  Rather, the balanc-
191 See Notice of Disclosure of Student Records, Morgan Hill Concerned Par-
ents Ass’n v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., No. 2:11–cv–03471 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2013),
2013 WL 1326301 (“Examples of information that is stored on CDE’s databases
and network drives includes name, social security number, home address,
demographics, course information, statewide assessment results, teacher
demographics, program information, behavior and discipline information, pro-
gress reports, special education assessment plans, special education assess-
ments/evaluations, Individualized Education Programs (IEPs), records pertaining
to health, mental health and medical information, student statewide identifiers
(SSID), attendance statistics, information on suspensions and expulsions, and
results on state tests.”) (emphasis added).
192 See Order at 5:25–6:7, Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Ass’n v. Cal. Dep’t
of Educ., No. 2:11–cv–03471 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016), ECF No. 164.
193 See generally supra note 189. R
194 See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and
the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2002) (“States maintain records
spanning an individual’s life from birth to death, including records of births,
marriages, divorces, professional licenses, voting information, worker’s compen-
sation, personnel files (for public employees), property ownership, arrests, victims
of crime, criminal and civil court proceedings, and scores of other information.
Federal agencies maintain records pertaining to immigration, bankruptcy, social
security, military personnel, and so on.  These records contain personal informa-
tion including a person’s physical description (age, photograph, height, weight,
eye color); race, nationality, and gender; family life (children, marital history,
divorces, and even intimate details about one’s marital relationship); residence,
location, and contact information (address, telephone number, value and type of
property owned, description of one’s home); political activity (political party affilia-
tion, contributions to political groups, frequency of voting); financial condition
(bankruptcies, financial information, salary, debts); employment (place of employ-
ment, job position, salary, sick leave); criminal history (arrests, convictions, traffic
citations); health and medical condition (doctors’ reports, psychiatrists’ notes,
drug prescriptions, diseases and other disorders); and identifying information
(mother’s maiden name, Social Security number).”).
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ing of the privacy interest (and other considerations) must still
be made against the needs of the case.  High costs for redaction
may lead a court to order that less data be released, no data be
released, or another privacy protection option be employed.
2. Order the Least Amount of Data Necessary
Perhaps the most underused tool for judges is to demand
that the requesting party demonstrate how data will be used.
In other words, the court can ask for an expert to explain: why
this data?  Would less (fewer details or a smaller dataset) do?
Would a less sensitive proxy suffice?  For example, in the Mor-
gan Hill case, the total population of school children data for a
set time period was ordered for release—an estimated ten mil-
lion records.195  By “total population” it meant each and every
student that fell in that category.  However, rarely do empiri-
cists have all the data they want.  Therefore, empiricists have
spent decades designing strong, reliable empirical models that
produce reliable results using just a sampling of the total popu-
lation.  To be sure, in general, data is like chocolate, more is
better than less.  However, there are competing interests that
must be weighed.  Highly sensitive data can and should be
released “proportionate to the needs of the case.”  It is incum-
bent on the requesting party to show they need—not merely
desire—the requested data.  This permits a judge the option to
compel a subset of a large, sensitive dataset.  Although this
may fail to protect the data of those who fall into the “sample,”
it will at least protect the privacy interest of those outside the
sample.  It also may reduce the costs of redaction so that even
the “sample” is better protected.
3. Provide Affected Individuals an “Opt-Out” Option
When third-party privacy interests are implicated, a judge
may consider providing third parties an opt-out option.  The
benefit of the “opt-out” is that individuals vary greatly as to the
importance they ascribe to personal privacy.196  An opt-out
permits the privacy-concerned individual to self-identify this
preference.197  The opt-out also permits a judge to adjust a
195 See discussion infra Part V.
196 In the case of children, it is even more pronounced as a child lacks the legal
capacity to consent and parents must make the privacy choice on the child’s
behalf.
197 Opt-out regimes may be complex and expensive, and a deciding judge who
herself is privacy-unconcerned may not see the need (or benefit) in requiring this
option.  To bring the issue home to a privacy-unconcerned judge, one commenta-
tor suggests that the judge be required to reveal her own data (including it in the
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-5\CRN501.txt unknown Seq: 44 27-AUG-18 15:34
1144 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:1101
discovery order if a greater privacy interest is revealed than the
judge had anticipated.  Judges themselves have privacy prefer-
ences and, left to their own internal gauge, may grossly miscal-
culate the privacy interests at stake.  Perhaps the most
intuitive way for parents to protect their child’s information
would be to “opt-out” of the judicial order—to declare that their
own child’s records cannot be released.  Interestingly, the opt-
out option was not in place for affected students in the Morgan
Hill case.198
However, the opt-out is a suboptimal solution at best.
First, there are costs and administrative difficulties that may
prevent truly effective notice to all potentially affected third
parties.  Second, asking individuals to self-identify in order to
opt-out may, in and of itself, reveal identifying information to
the court that the truly privacy-concerned would hesitate to
send.199  Finally, an opt-out may not even be an option if the
data requested is “proportionate to the case.”
order) when she permits discovery of others’ data.  To be sure, this may be an
effective means of stressing the importance of the privacy interest.  However, a
tenured (Article III) judge whose job will not suffer with the exposure of personal
information may not fully appreciate the impact such a release might have on the
common citizen.
198 See Theresa Harrington, Ability to Opt Out Uncertain in Lawsuit Requiring
Student Data Release, EDSOURCE (Feb. 18, 2016), https://edsource.org/2016/
ability-to-opt-out-uncertain-in-lawsuit-requiring-student-data-release/95043
[https://perma.cc/GH8S-CBCM] (“The way we’re interpreting it is: ‘Get your
paperwork in now and the court is going to decide whether that is an opt-out or
not,’ . . . . ‘So, we strongly encourage everyone to get their paperwork in because
the judge will make that determination.’”) (quoting Robert Oakes, spokesman for
the California Department of Education).
Compare supra note 24 with note 198.  The objection form in the first source R
allows those who file it to preserve their privacy rights and enforce them in the
event their files are disclosed unlawfully, but it is no guarantee that the files will
not be disclosed.  In fact, the court has denied a petition to stay disclosure of the
students’ records despite the pending litigation regarding the legality of that or-
dered disclosure.  If it is determined that the order is overbroad and therefore
invalid, only those who filed the objection form may have the ability to bring a civil
action to assert their breached privacy right.
199 Again, as an example of a policy antithetical to individuals’ privacy interest,
the Morgan Hill judge did not give an “opt-out” option but rather set up a “com-
plaint” system.  To file a complaint, the name of the child, name of parent or
guardian, school district and years of attendance had to be entered.  The court
required it to be mailed which is inconvenient, yes, but not a bad, low-tech means
of protecting data (if the hard copy is managed well, under seal, etc.).  However, so
many complaints were filed that the judge urged other judges to set up an elec-
tronic filing—this may be problematic if not properly guarded.
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C. Step Three—Promote Cybersecurity
In recent months, hackers are hitting well-known law
firms200—a reminder that a protective order does not protect
data from outside threats.  A judge should enter each judicial
order with the mindset that the data compelled will be data at
risk.  Data can be compromised by high-tech hacker attacks in
the cloud or by the low-tech loss of a laptop or flash drive.  A
judge cannot, and should not, however, try to become a cyber-
security guru.
In addition to limiting the exposure of data in the first
place,201 a few additional, threshold cybersecurity strategies
for judicial orders are needed.  These may include a combina-
tion of the following: (a) assign a special master; (b) limit the
number of people with access to the data; (c) keep data under
the defendant’s security protections; limit the electronic trans-
fer and storage of data; and (d) use “under seal” and protective
orders liberally but rely on them as warnings rather than effec-
tive cyber protections.
1. Assign a Special Master
As discussed above, assigning a special master to super-
vise the discovery process is well-known to judges and may be
of particular importance when a large, sensitive dataset is at
stake.  In choosing a special master, technological expertise is
as important in such a case as is legal acumen—arguably more
so.  But a special master of a large case may not be best suited
to protect, or even see, the privacy issues at stake.  Therefore,
the judge may wish to provide strict guidance on privacy mat-
ters or appoint a “privacy master” tasked with protecting un-
represented third-party privacy interests.  In particular, any
special master should apprise the judge of difficulties in pro-
tecting the privacy interests outlined by the judge in Steps One
and Two.  For example, if redaction as ordered becomes prob-
lematic, the judge may have to rebalance the original order.
200 See Hong & Sidel, supra note 161, at 2. R
201 The first strategy, limit the data exposed, is of course just an application of
Step One set forth above.  It is the most effective of cybersecurity strategies, if the
court does not order the data disclosed, then the court has no cybersecurity
interest in it.  Of course the data may be unsecure as held by the non-requesting
party.  That is a problem between the data holder and the data owner.  That is
irrelevant to this calculus.  As a defender of the public trust and the status it is
granted, the court has a heightened obligation to consider the interests of noncon-
senting parties.
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2. Limit the People with Data Access
Limiting the number of people with access to the data is
also important.  Certain people have the right to access data—
the requesting party being the obvious rightsholder.  However,
it might be useful to limit access by non-essential people.  For
example, the requesting party may be working with a law firm
but the entire law firm does not need blanket access to the
data.
3. Keep Data Under Producing Party’s Security Controls;
Limit the Electronic Transfer and Storage of Data
Part of the problem with the electronic transfer and storage
of data is that multiple copies and potential points of access
and leakage are created.  As a practical matter, data need not
have a “location” in the simple sense of the word.  In fact,
engineers may design redundant systems that separate data
(even individual data) and store them in various locations.  A
rough analogy would be ripping a page of information in half
and storing each half in a different location; to retrieve data, a
decryption code can be used to bring together the two halves
for a full picture.202
Arguably, defendant and plaintiff may have different stor-
age locations and different security measures.  If defendant is a
private sector entity, then it can be reasonably assumed that
individuals voluntarily gave their information to the defendant
knowing (or trusting) the security measures defendant em-
ployed.  Keeping these security measures at the status quo
would mean that the individual’s privacy protections are no
less than those which he or she initially bargained for.  A judge
may therefore condition plaintiff’s access to defendant’s data to
on-site access at the defendant’s offices or other data access
point.  In the Morgan Hill case, for example, plaintiffs were
wisely limited to data queries, rather than full data access.
Plaintiffs presented the queries to defendant who then could
run the query on defendant’s own data systems.203
202 See Ariel Rabkin, Data Need Not Have Location, AEIDEAS (Mar. 2, 2017,
6:00 AM), http://www.aei.org/publication/data-need-location/ [http://perma
.cc/3T4R-4PH3] (proposing that, in general, United States cybersecurity policy
should focus on capabilities, not location) (“A good rule would say something like
‘data should not be transferred in such a way that the recipient can extract the
following particular private aspects’ or ‘data must be stored securely in such a
way that unauthorized parties cannot learn the plaintext.’”).
203 See Order at 6:16–24, Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Ass’n v. Cal. Dep’t of
Educ., No. 2:11–cv–03471 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016), ECF No. 164.
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To the extent this is not viable, the special master may
carefully detail how data or data results be transferred, stored,
and destroyed by secure methods for additional protection.
4. Reliance on Filings “Under Seal” and Protective Orders
as Warnings Only
In the digital age, a court’s protective order, or an order to
place a filing “under seal,” is not what it used to be.  A court’s
sole reliance on a protective order to guard sensitive electronic
data is, in fact, a dangerously outdated notion.  Protective or-
ders are an important legal device in the protection of data;
they clarify the importance of handling sensitive information
with care.  But, for example, the Morgan Hill protective order
states that all the records used by plaintiffs are to be “de-
stroyed” when no longer needed,204 demonstrating a lack of
understanding of how digital data can rapidly spread to a mul-
titude of platforms quickly, making it extraordinarily difficult to
“destroy.”  Moreover, it is small comfort that “only the lawyers
will have access” to data.  First, this is not entirely accurate as
a matter of law—plaintiffs, plaintiffs’ lawyers, and plaintiffs’
experts are all permitted access to data as may be required by
the case.  Second, if not properly controlled, data transfers
from defendant to plaintiff potentially may be stored in several
locations—the respective clouds used by each user, servers of
various users, etc.—each independently susceptible to attack
or inadvertent leak.
V
MORGAN HILL—A CAUTIONARY EXAMPLE
As a case study for judicial discovery orders of highly sensi-
tive data, this Article examines the current, ongoing California
case Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Ass’n v. California Dep’t of
Educ.205  This particular case exemplifies the need for judges to
actively limit the size and scope of discovery based on a propor-
tionality standard.  In this case, the judge took a more passive
role and merely approved the litigants’ discovery agree-
ments.206  As a result, the Morgan Hill judge has ordered an
204 See Order at 14:25–27, Morgan Hill, No. 2:11–cv–03471 (E.D. Cal. May 5,
2016), ECF No. 60 (“Within 60 days after the final disposition of this ac-
tion . . . each Receiving Party must return all Protected Material to the Producing
Party or destroy such material.”).
205 Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Ass’n v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., No.
2:11–cv–03471, 2013 WL 1326301 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2013).
206 The plaintiffs and defendants had a dispute regarding the production of
certain discovery requested by the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs moved to compel
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estimated ten million students’ full records to be disclosed,
relying more on the secondary protections of a protective order
than the primary protections that only discovery limits can
provide.207
More than a year later, the court issued another order
regarding the disclosure of information in compliance with an
agreement between the parties.  In conjunction with that order,
the court issued a notice of disclosure.  The court acknowl-
edged that:
[e]xamples of information that is stored on CDE’s databases
and network drives includes name, social security number,
home address, demographics, course information, statewide
assessment results, teacher demographics, program infor-
mation, behavior and discipline information, progress re-
ports, special education assessment plans, special education
assessments/evaluations, Individualized Education Pro-
grams (IEPs), records pertaining to health, mental health and
medical information, student statewide identifiers (SSID), at-
tendance statistics, information on suspensions and expul-
sions, and results on state tests.208
Still, despite the clearly sensitive nature of that informa-
tion, the court did not exclude any of that information from the
discovery request.209  Instead, the court determined that the
protective order was satisfactory to protect the privacy inter-
est.210  Specifically, the court found that the educational
records “could be disclosed, in one form or another, as long as
parents or students are notified of the disclosure by publica-
production of that discovery. See Order, Morgan Hill, No. 2:11–cv–03471–
KJM–AC (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2014), ECF No. 64.  Although the court denied the
plaintiffs’ motion to compel, the record makes clear that the court was actually
confirming an agreement made between the parties during the interim of the
motion to compel and the court’s ruling on that motion.  Order at 2:16–3:19,
Morgan Hill, No. 2:11–cv–03471–KJM–AC (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2014), ECF No. 85.
The parties agreed that the data would be produced “in a manner to allow plain-
tiffs to track students, to the maximum extent feasible, wherever they are identi-
fied throughout defendant’s electronic databases.” Id. at 2:17–19.
207 Id. at 1:20–27; see also Order at 7:7–9, Morgan Hill, No.
2:11–cv–03471–KJM–AC (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2015), ECF No. 116 (“Here, there is a
protective order in place governing the disclosure of confidential information.
(ECF No. 60.)  That order is adequate to ensure the information disclosed is not
disseminated to others.”).
208 Notice of Disclosure of Student Records, Morgan Hill, No.
2:11–cv–03471–KJM–AC (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2013), 2013 WL 1326301.
209 See id.
210 See Order, Morgan Hill, No. 2:11–cv–03471–KJM–AC (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1,
2016), ECF No. 164.
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tion and a protective order restricts the use of the information
to this litigation only.”211
At the encouragement of her appointed special master, the
Judge amended this part of the order to keep the most sensitive
data set (CALPADS) on site with the defendant (the California
Department of Education), provided that Defendant assist
Plaintiff in running their requested data queries.  This on-site
query option is an improvement over a blanket data-transfer
order and an option more consistent with the protective proce-
dures set forth in this Article.  It should be noted, however, that
although the Judge later ordered that the CALPADS data stay
on site with the California Department of Education,212 there
are still strong privacy and cybersecurity concerns left
unaddressed.
The court in this case clearly considers the information
sensitive enough to require a protective order and a special
master, but seems not to appreciate that those protections are
unlikely to adequately protect the privacy interests at stake.
The privacy interest is best protected by narrowing the scope
and redacting information, and protective orders and special
masters should be used as a final layer of protection once the
discovery request has been whittled down to the information
reasonably essential to the case.  Where, as here, the digital
discovery is sensitive information concerning minors, the pri-
vacy interest deserves even greater consideration than the
traditional use of protective orders and special masters.
Again, the court did not consider fully the privacy interest
of affected parties—especially third-parties—when deciding to
compel disclosure of private information in the first place.  As
set forth in subpart II.A of this Article, if the burden outweighs
the benefit, then the discovery request should be denied in
totality.213  In turn, if the information is reasonably essential to
the case, then the privacy interest should be reconsidered to
limit the scope of the request only to the information that is
required.214  That was not done in this case and, as a result,
211 Id. at 4:23–25 (quoting ECF No. 116) (internal quotation marks omitted).
212 Id.
213 See, e.g., Appler v. Mead Johnson & Co., LLC, No. 3:14–cv–166–RLY–WGH,
2015 WL 5615038, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 24, 2015) (declining to compel the
production of entire categories of data from a Facebook profile due to the privacy
burden outweighing the relevance to the case).
214 See Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., 549 F. Supp. 2d 288,
294–95 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (narrowing the scope of the requested discovery to only
those math students that Plaintiff taught during the time period at issue).
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the most personal information of an entire generation of Cali-
fornia children is unnecessarily vulnerable.215
VI
A PIGOVIAN TAX FOR GOVERNMENT COLLECTED DATA
Obviously, the best way for information recipients to pro-
tect sensitive data is to not collect sensitive data.  For instance,
in the Morgan Hill case, if the defendant, the California Depart-
ment of Education, had insisted that school districts not report
social security numbers of children (for example) in the first
instance, then the data would not exist for the judge to compel
in discovery.216
Ironically, the Eastern District of California follows a simi-
lar limiting principle.  The Eastern District publishes its own
rules for evidence that is to be filed to the court217 and specifi-
cally requests that complete social security numbers are not
filed with the court.218  The court rightly identifies this informa-
tion as too sensitive, and not sufficiently useful, for the court to
hold.
But as discussed earlier, it is difficult to incentivize govern-
ment entities to be circumspect in the collection of data.219
Government entities are more difficult than private entities to
sue in tort.  Alternatively, government entities, unlike private
entities, face no reputational effects (brand risk) to incent cau-
tionary data collection and protection investments.  To bolster
privacy protections in government data collection, it would be
useful to create a statutory right to information privacy.220  For
215 See Order at 5:24–7:5, Morgan Hill, No. 2:11–cv–03471 (E.D. Cal. March 1,
2016), ECF No. 164.
216 This is a bit tricky as the social security numbers of special education
students are used to coordinate data across several government agencies.  This
practice is now being corrected in recognition of the sensitivity of this data. See
Cal. Assemb. A.B. 2097, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016) (drafting an act to
repeal the schools’ authority to collect and solicit social security numbers and
authorizing the schools to create individualized student identification numbers).
217 See generally Local Rules of the United States District Court, E.D. CAL.
(effective Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/assets/File/ED
CA%20Local%20Rules%20Effective%201-1-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/H76N-
5KRJ].
218 Id. at Rule 140 (requiring all but the last four digits of a social security
number, all but the last four numbers of a financial account number, and all but
the year in someone’s birthdate to be redacted in documents filed with the court,
and also requiring children’s names to be abbreviated and home addresses to be
limited depending on the type of action).
219 Supra subpart I.C.
220 As mentioned several times, in limited circumstances, some statutory pro-
tections already exist.  However, even in these areas, adding a cause of action for
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any such right to have a disciplining impact, the breach of it by
a government agency must carry a penalty—a Pigovian tax on
the overcollection and underprotection of data might be a good
start.221
A good legal moment to exercise such a right is within the
discovery context—to incentivize (or defray the costs for) inter-
ested third parties to intervene in a litigation and protect their
own interests.  The legal action might be “wrongful disclosure”
and would carry a fixed fine if found valid.222  Although full
development of such a regime is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, a bare-bones framework may include the following.
The goal of a wrongful disclosure claim would be two-fold:
(1) to incentivize the government to invest in vigorous discovery
defenses when they arise and (2) to invest in cybersecurity
measures for the data collected.  As a corollary, a “wrongful
disclosure” claim might be effective in limiting government
overcollection of data—whether actually disclosed or not.  In
the discovery context, an ancillary “overcollection” claim would
be easy to add to a wrongful disclosure cause of action.  For
example, if the agency wrongfully disclosed the information but
collected the least amount necessary to meet their mandated
task, then the agency is liable for X damages.  If, however, the
agency wrongfully disclosed the information and collected
more than was necessary to meet their mandated task, then
the agency is liable for X + Y damages.223
Again, government collection of data is particularly prob-
lematic because of the coercive nature of such information re-
quests.  It is also problematic because of the unique disclosure
obligations of government under the various sunshine acts.  At
the very least, incenting agencies to carefully match data re-
quests with the entities’ data needs would help reduce the
the breach of the statute and for any general overcollection of data would assist in
the self-disciplining of government record collection.
221 A Pigovian tax is described in Wikipedia as “a tax on any market activity
that generates negative externalities (costs not included in the market price).  The
tax is intended to correct an inefficient market outcome, and does so by being set
equal to the social cost of the negative externalities.” Pigovian Tax, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigovian_tax [https://perma.cc/Q5X9-XNX7]
(last modified Feb. 21, 2017).
222 To incent vigorous protection of third-party interest, a wrongful disclosure
claim would include failure to properly limit the scope of disclosure of private
information to plaintiffs.  In other words, disclosure to the public at large would
not be a necessary element to setting forth a valid claim.
223 It may also be desirable to hold the government strictly liable for overcollec-
tion of sensitive data as a standalone cause of action, but again, that is outside
the scope of this Article.
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number of involuntary transactions in which the privacy-con-
scious must participate.224
CONCLUSION
With each new privacy “crisis”—from the Snowden revela-
tions to the FBI Apple tangle, and Facebook data exposures to
whatever is next—the larger issue revealed is that privacy law
is behind the technology curve.  Information has never been
more accessible, transferable, or vulnerable, and the law pro-
vides inadequate protection.  The Supreme Court has not yet
found a constitutional right to information privacy, the few
statutes that seek to protect private information are riddled
with exceptions, and the tort regime severely limits a plaintiff’s
ability to recover for wrongfully disclosed information, espe-
cially when the government is the defendant.
The revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has
made strides to protect information from extraneous discovery,
but to incentivize socially optimal levels of informational pri-
vacy, constitutional, statutory, and tort common law need to
adapt.  Judges play a privileged role in our society as exempli-
fied by the incredible trust we grant them to compel disclosure
of private information to another, hostile party.  What is pro-
posed here is a simple, practical process to help judges balance
affected parties’ privacy interests and cybersecurity concerns
against the need for trial discovery.
To recap, Step One is a “privacy screen” to determine the
weight a court should give the privacy interest by considering
the type of information requested, statutory protections for it,
and the status (private or public) of the litigating parties.  Step
Two is to protect affected parties’ privacy interests by employ-
ing three tactics to limit the exposure of sensitive data: (a)
demand that data be redacted and/or aggregated to remove
individual identifiers; (b) determine the least amount of data
access that is “proportional to the needs of the case;” and (c)
provide affected individuals an “opt-out” option.
Step Three is to employ four strategies to protect affected
parties’ cybersecurity interest: (a) assign a special master; (b)
limit the number of people with access to the data; (c) keep data
at the data provider’s location; limit the electronic transfer and
storage of data; and (d) use “under seal” and protective orders
liberally, but rely on them as warnings rather than effective
cyber protections.
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In particular, due to the unique nature of government-
collected data, the analyses in this Article demonstrate the
need for strong judicial intervention when personal, sensitive
government-collected data is at issue.  Presently, public enti-
ties have little to no incentive to limit data collection, invest in
cybersecurity measures and defend against broad discovery
requests.  In addition to judicial engagement in discovery, this
Article suggests a new cause of action: a type of Pigovian tax on
public entities that may help align the privacy interests of indi-
viduals with the data needs of government entities.
The good news is that the United States has a highly pro-
fessional judiciary that is well-suited to adapt to the changing
demands and dangers posed by an interconnected world.  But
in the digital era, the courts’ essential gatekeeper role is magni-
fied as one judge acting alone can destroy the privacy interests
of millions.  Following the framework presented here will not
guarantee against privacy losses nor will it prevent all data
spills, but it will hopefully raise awareness and the protective
diligence of all concerned parties.  Moreover, there is no doubt
that it is time to recalibrate our privacy regimes from a data
protection emphasis to a data limitation emphasis.  Hopefully
the analyses presented in this Article will be of use in changing
how we adjust statutory and judicial privacy protections to the
modern realities of the Internet and era of big data.
